


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HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPAIN'S ENTRANCE
INTO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION AND ITS LACK OF FULL INTEGRATION
INTO THE MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

THESIS

Perry R. Oaks
Captain, USAF

AFIT/GLM/LSM/90S-41

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THESIS

**Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management**

Perry R. Oaks, B.S.

Captain, USAF

September 1990

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Perry R. Oaks

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Abstract

This thesis examines factors surrounding Spain's entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as its non-integration into the alliance's military force structure. International relationships significant in the time preceding Spain's entrance into NATO are examined, focusing primarily on the United States. NATO's benefits from Spain's membership are discussed, pointing to possible Spanish contributions such as providing staging and logistical facilities as well as protecting key strategic sea lines of communication. Advantages afforded to Spain by joining NATO are also explored, with the chief benefit being acceptance into the European Economic Community. This research assesses the changing attitude of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) towards NATO. The PSOE initially opposed Spanish integration into NATO while the country was ruled by a centrist government. However, when the PSOE took control of the government their NATO position became noncommittal and finally, by the 1986 NATO referendum, switched to a pro-alliance stance. The final issue addressed deals with the bilateral defense agreement between Spain and the United States. Of considerable interest is the reduction of U.S. military forces in Spain, specifically, the withdrawal of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from Torrejon Air Base.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPAIN'S ENTRANCE INTO
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INTO THE MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE

I. Introduction

Overview

One of the most significant actions of the post-World War II era was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. First signed on April 4, 1949 by the foreign ministers of the twelve initial members, the new alliance came into force on August 24, 1949, when each of the participating members formally deposited their instruments of ratification. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being during a time of increasing East-West tension. The alliance was formed to protect the security and political freedom currently enjoyed by those alliance members (Miller, 1989:1).

A new page in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance was written on May 30, 1982 with the formal entrance of Spain into the alliance. For Spain, this brought about the termination of a quest which officially began in 1959 when Spain first applied for membership in the alliance and was first denied membership because of the repressive regime of Francisco Franco (Robles, 1984:5).

Spain was not only excluded from NATO because of its past record under Franco, but also because of the continuing character of the Franco regime. Whitaker, in his book Spain and the Defense of the West, claims that Spain's neighboring European nations found Franco's government to be incompatible with the ideals behind the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty. These principles stated in the Preamble of the treaty that the member nations were to be committed to the defense of "the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (Whitaker, 1961:37)." The original members of NATO did not believe Spain was committed to "strengthening their free institutions," as Article Two of the treaty espouses (Whitaker, 1961:37).

Spain's eventual acceptance by and entrance into the alliance marked the first major change in the makeup of NATO'S organization since France completely withdrew its nation's military forces on 1 July 1966 (Robles, 1984:5; Hanel, 1984:2). The acquisition of Spanish membership in the alliance allowed NATO to bolster the alliance's combat strength with respect to the southern region and demonstrated to the world that the organization continues to stand strong against the foes of democratic ideals in the Western world.

The Iberian Peninsula is of vast strategic importance to NATO, and the inclusion of Spain into the NATO alliance

was a key step in maintaining the organization's strength throughout Southern Europe. The United States has long recognized the strategic importance of Spain's geographical position. The Pact of Madrid, signed on September 26, 1953 between Spain and the United States, dramatically increased the United States' presence in the Mediterranean by establishing a number of military bases and other key, strategic installations on Spanish soil. These military facilities quite possibly "constitute, along with the bases in Turkey, perhaps the most important network of American bases outside the United States" (Prevost, 85/86:351). The addition of the U.S. military installations in Spain significantly increased the United States' ability to monitor the security of the Mediterranean sea lanes, lanes which held the shortest routes to the oil fields of the Middle East (Cortada, 1978:223-224).

Spain continues to be a critical asset to the alliance because of her geographical situation as a land bridge between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. From this location, Spain is able to monitor and control entrance into and out of the Mediterranean through the nation's dominance of the Strait of Gibraltar (see Figure 1). All sea transportation from the United States and other northern European allies attempting to supply the nations, such as Greece and Turkey, bordering on the Mediterranean must pass through the Strait, a narrow waterway between Spain and Morocco. The Sprait currently maintains an approximate flow




Figure 1 Spain and the Mediterranean Basin

of 200 ships a day which carry 800 million charge tons, of which 360 million are crude oil (Nardiz Vidal, 1989:75). This opening to the Atlantic Ocean is also important to the Soviet Union because other than the Suez Canal the Strait of Gibraltar is the only passageway from the Soviets' warm water ports on the Black Sea to the international sea lanes.

Even though Spain would play a critical and important role in the defense of Europe against a threat from the Warsaw Pact countries, the nation's socialist government has decided against the integration of Spain's military forces into NATO's military force structure. When the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol - PSOE), under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez, came into power in 1982, they did so riding a wave of anti-NATO emotion. The negative attitude of the PSOE towards NATO led many onlookers to fear Spain would pull out of NATO soon after the nation had joined. Sr. Gonzalez promised the Spanish people in his campaign pledges that they, the people, would decide the future of Spain's involvement with NATO.

The new leaders of Spain's young democracy began to change their collective view on the desirability of NATO membership shortly after coming to power, and soon began the difficult chore of convincing the Spanish populace that their nation should remain within the alliance's structure. A referendum was held concerning the NATO question in March 1986, and after a long, hard-fought pro-NATO campaign by the

Socialist government, the Spanish people elected to remain alliance members.

One of the keys to achieving a "Yes" vote in the referendum was a promise by Felipe Gonzalez to reduce the number of American servicemen stationed in Spain. The focus of this reduction centered around the removal of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), and the wing's 72 nuclear weapon's capable F-16 fighter aircraft, from Torrejon Air Base, on the outskirts of Madrid. Seven negotiation sessions were held between Spain and the United States concerning the base agreement over a two year period before finally reaching a final arrangement. The military strength of the United States in western Mediterranean region will be drastically reduced by the withdrawal of the 401st TFW from Spain, and if the wing is not able to be relocated in Europe, the southern flank of the NATO alliance will have suffered a severe loss.

Problem Statement

A paradox exists due to the actions of the Spanish government over the past decade. Why would Spain enter into the NATO alliance with Canada, the United States, and other European nations and then refuse to fully integrate into NATO's military structure? The decision by the Spanish government to significantly reduce the United States' military presence in Spain raises further questions about Spain's present and future commitment to the NATO alliance.

Justification

The history and progress of the United States has been closely tied to Europe ever since the colonization of the 'New World' began. The U.S. emerged from World War I as a new world superpower. Desired or not, attached to this superpower status was a responsibility for understanding and participating in the affairs of world politics.

The United States has maintained a constant, deep military tie with Europe since the initial phase of the second world war, beginning with the 1939 revision of the Neutrality Act which allowed the sale of arms to the British on a cash-and-carry basis during peacetime. The Lend-Lease program, initiated in March of 1941, eventually resulted in approximately 50 billion dollars worth of arms, food, and other aid being supplied to U.S. allies in defense of their freedom, and further entwined the United States in the foreign affairs of the world. This military connection was maintained after the war by the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty, now known as the NATO alliance, which came into being on 24 August 1949. The future of the United States is closely tied to the future of our European allies, emphasizing the vast importance of understanding our allies' affairs.

In the fast paced world in which we now live, the successes of nations are built upon their ability to formulate and conduct effective foreign policy. Even though

the foreign policy of a nation should be focused on the present and should try to anticipate the future, the policy must take into account an investigation of the past. The past provides the facts upon which policy will be formulated. F. Parkinson, a former Assistant Director of the London Institute of World Affairs, stressed the importance of historical analysis:

Theorizing on the subject of international relations with one's back turned on the past is bound to be a wasteful exercise, as history presents a treasure-house of both experience and ideas. In the field of the study of international relations, conventional diplomatic history has taken care of the former, while the latter has been neglected. Yet, ideas of the past are far from irrelevant to current or future problems of international relations. Judiciously drawn upon, they can be helpful in constructing new theories of international relations, may open minds to fresh thought, and encourage scholars to engage in bold philosophical synthesis of old and new. (Parkinson, 1977:7)

Since the past plays such an important role in shaping the future, a need exists to perform in depth historical studies as part of the effort to understand the major issues affecting the United States' foreign policy in Europe. A comprehensive study of Spain, surrounding Spain's entrance and integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, could provide a more precise understanding of the direction U.S. policy should follow with this country.

Scope

Spanish policy, with regards to NATO, has been shaped by many factors over the years. For the purpose of this thesis, a historical analysis will be conducted in three

major areas: (1) Spain's historical relationship with the major world powers involved in the East-West conflict, (2) the political atmosphere in Spain over the past decade, and (3) the significant reduction of US forces from the country. Geographic, sociopolitical and economic factors will be considered in the thesis to more fully comprehend and analyze the situation.

Investigative Questions

To properly analyze the situation with Spain and NATO, the following investigative questions will be researched:

1. What has been the historical position of Spain with regard to the United States, to other European countries, and to the Soviet Union?
2. What is the strategic importance of Spain to NATO?
3. What is the strategic importance of NATO to Spain?
4. What was the political climate in Spain at the time of the nation's entrance into the NATO alliance and how has the climate changed since then?
5. What is the Spanish government's perception of their nation's commitment to the rest of Europe and to the NATO countries in particular?
6. What are the United States and the other NATO countries' perceptions of Spain's purpose as a NATO member?
7. What is the significance of the large reduction of U.S. forces from Spain?

8. How will Spain's desire to fully participate in the 1992 European Economic Community (EEC) affect their future participation in NATO?

Methodology

The research methodology of this historical study primarily relied upon an extensive literature review of secondary information gathered from numerous sources. The study examined Spain's geography, history, socio-politics, and economy to gain insight into the nation's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Several libraries were searched for information dealing with the research topic. The initial search encompassed libraries from the following educational institutions: Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright State University, University of Dayton, and The Ohio State University. The Intra-Library Loan service was also utilized to obtain readings not available in the local area. Readings from the State Department's Office of Public Affairs bulletins, government periodicals, political science journals, newspapers and magazines provided information on past and present activities and attitudes in Spain.

The major problem encountered in this methodology was the inability to find a source for Spanish periodicals dating back over the past ten years. The Spanish point of view came from reading articles and books written by Spaniards, yet published in English speaking publications,

which dealt with the nation's entry into the NATO alliance and the current government's view of the situation. The research would have been more robust by obtaining access to Spanish periodicals; however, enough Spaniards have written articles and books for publication in the United States to present an accurate picture from the Spanish point of view.

Plan of Presentation for the Thesis

Chapter I: Introduction. This chapter includes the problem statement, the justification of the thesis, the scope of the research, and the investigative questions utilized to narrow the research and answer the problem. This first chapter also contains an overview of NATO and the history of Spain's entrance into the alliance as well as a description of the methodology followed in the preparation of the thesis.

Chapter II: Historical Relations Between Spain, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Western Europe. This chapter studies the historical ties and conflicts between Spain and the major world powers involved in the East-West conflict. A heavier emphasis was placed on the relationship between Spain and the United States because of the fact that since 1953 the U.S. has played the most significant role with Spanish foreign policy.

Chapter III: The Importance of Spain to NATO and of NATO to Spain. This chapter studies Spain's relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from two points

different points of view. The first point of view addresses the reasons behind NATO's desire to include Spain in the alliance and the benefits the alliance received from the new addition. The second perspective deals with the advantages Spain received by becoming an alliance member. The chapter covers military, geographical, economical and political concerns.

Chapter IV: The Socialists' Position. This chapter examines the political turmoil in Spain over NATO membership and NATO participation. The research covers the rise to power of the Socialist party and how the PSOE's attitude towards the Atlantic alliance changed one hundred and eighty degrees in the span of just a few short years. The chapter also addresses the NATO referendum and the reasons behind holding the referendum.

Chapter V: Base Negotiations. This chapter addresses the bilateral Defense Agreements between Spain and the United States since the 1953 Pact of Madrid. The research covers the renewal negotiations of each agreement looking at the problems encountered with each renewal. The majority of the chapter deals with the most recent negotiations, concluded in 1988, and the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Torrejon Air Base on the outskirts of Madrid.

Chapter VI: Conclusions and Recommendations. This final chapter summarizes the major findings of the research effort by containing the answers to the investigative questions from the first chapter. The conclusions drawn

from the research are also included in this chapter along with recommendations for further research.

II. Historical Relations Between Spain,
The United States, The Soviet Union, and Western Europe.

Introduction

Spain has consistently maintained a pro-western stance with regards to her foreign policy; however, it should be noted that since the time when the Spanish defeated the French, under Napoleon, during the early part of the nineteenth century, Spain has ceased to participate in European conflicts. Spain's next major foreign war was the Spanish-American War in 1898 and Spain's other foreign conflicts that took place during the twentieth century were fought in North Africa, near Ceuta and Melilla (Robles Piquer, 19^o6/87:325).

The Spanish nation remained neutral throughout both of the World Wars, although fascist Franco did lean more toward Hitler and the Axis powers in WWII. In fact, Franco's pro-Nazi stance, along with his Fascist government, were behind the reasons for Spain not being permitted into NATO, participate in the Marshall Plan, nor being allowed initial membership in the United Nations (Smith, 1989:210).

This chapter will look at Spain's relationships with the major players involved with her decision to join the NATO alliance. Spain claims to have traditionally maintained its roots with the West. Spain's former Foreign Minister, Fernando Moran, wrote in 1982 that even though

Spain was undergoing a very difficult period of change as a young democracy, he firmly proclaimed that this change:

would not harm the profound historical ties of friendship and cooperation which exist between the Spanish nation and the countries of Europe and America, particularly in as far as the defense of western values and its principles of civilization and democracy are concerned. Whatever the final outcome of this process is, Spain will never change the essential orientation which she has maintained throughout her history.
(Moran, 1983:20)

How profound are these ties with the United States and Western Europe, and how are Spain's relations with the Soviet Union as well?

The United States

Spain's experiences with the Americas go back many centuries. Spain began its colonization of the New World at the turn of the sixteenth century. Beginning at that time, the other major European powers, Great Britain and France, attempted to share the wealth at the expense of the Spaniards. Over the next two hundred years, warfare between the European nations and with the United States contributed to the decline and isolation of the mighty Spanish empire.

The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. During the eighteenth century, the British rapidly expanded their influence all along the Atlantic seaboard. This expansion led to the signing of the Third Family Compact in 1761, an alliance with France directed against the British because of the damage the British influence and colonization in the Americas had imposed upon French and Spanish commerce

(Cortada, 1978:3,4). This treaty is important because, according to James W. Cortada in his book Two Nations Over Time, Spain and the United States, 1776-1977, this treaty "accented the problem that Spain faced in America: Anglo-Spanish competition for hegemony on the North American continent." This treaty has been called the birth certificate of the rivalry between the United States and Spain since, partially as a result of this alliance, the creation of the United States of America came about twenty-two years later. This same nation later replaced Britain as "Spain's main rival in the New World (Cortada. 1978:4)."

Spain was concerned that the U.S. and Britain would form one great nation with treaties and alliances in order to further any objectives they both might desire, at the expense of the Spaniards. Due to two centuries of conflict with the English (now Americans) in the New World, politicians came to believe a great conflict existed between the Hispanic culture and the Anglo-Saxon society. Cortada speaks of grudges carried by the new American nation against Spain:

They strongly believed Spain would be their most important enemy for years to come. Their accusations that Spaniards wanted to sabotage American Independence for the sake of much unsettled territory in the New World or for European objectives, clearly illustrated a future course of events. Not allowing them to use the Mississippi, which seemed large enough for both, angered many in the United States.... As a nation, Americans realized that to protect themselves from Spain, it might be necessary to push Spain completely off the North American Continent. (Cortada, 1978:18)

Americans came to believe that Spain "wanted to abort their natural destiny, which they defined as possessing the entire continent of North America (Cortada, 1978:20)."

Problems continued between Spain and the U.S. when, in 1823, President Monroe made certain statements in his annual address to Congress. In these remarks, which came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine, the President announced that governments in the New World would not "be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." Monroe went on to state that any nation which threatened to destroy an existing government in the Americas would be considered an enemy of the United States (Cortada, 1978:46). This policy maddened the Spanish government because of their extensive influence and large holdings throughout Latin America. During the following years, as France and Britain began to give recognition to claims of independence by new Latin America governments, Spain would refuse to acknowledge their claims.

Spain and the United States were at odds with each other throughout the nineteenth century. In fact, by late 1854, the two countries were on the brink of armed conflict. The cause of this crisis was a desire by some in the U.S. government to annex Cuba to the Union (Cortada, 1978:72).

The Spanish-American War. Cuba was a Spanish territory; however, the Spanish government was unable to properly handle the administration of its Caribbean colony

and the economic relations carried on between Cuba and the United States (Cortada, 1978:100).

Both nations strived to improve their position in Cuba while concurrently working to reduce the tension between each other, yet neither nation would make any compromises to reduce that high tension. Matters finally came to a head in the Spanish-American War of 1898. In just a few short months, the United States virtually ended Spanish involvement in the Caribbean and, even more importantly for the United States, began the long U.S. occupation of the Philippines (Cortada, 1978:121).

The years following the Spanish-American War saw a considerable change in the relationship between Spain and the United States. The U.S. no longer viewed her relations with Spain as very important, especially since Spain was no longer perceived as a threat to U.S. interests. Both nations believed their contacts on the European continent were more important than their relationship with each other. Cortada believes that because the U.S. became more aware of her "growing stature in world affairs," broader concerns in Europe and the Americas took precedence over actions with Spain. He also states that since Spain also "rated relations with the United States after those with Europe and the Mediterranean world" both nations actually felt and displayed minimal hostility towards each other once the Spanish-American War was concluded (Cortada, 1978:128).

The Spanish Civil War. The next major period of interaction between Spain and the U.S. was the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. This Spanish conflict marks a key period in U.S.-Spanish relations in the twentieth century. The Spanish Republic and Franco's Nationalists both petitioned other European nations for aid in their struggle against each other. The Republic identified itself with France and Britain due to their more liberal views, and hoped the United States would provide them with military aid since the U.S. also identified itself with France and Britain (Taylor, F., 1971:35).

Each of these nations refused to help the Spanish Republic due to the fear that this conflict on the Iberian peninsula would possibly spread into a general European war. This possibility became even more of a concern when Hitler and Mussolini came to the aid of Franco's Nationalists (Cortada 1978:186-189).

The chief concern of the population in the United States during the time period of the Spanish Civil War was the topic of unemployment and the economic depression which had held the United States by the throat since 1929. The major foreign policy concern in the U.S. was to avoid getting involved in any altercation which might possibly involve the nation in a European conflict. The isolationist desire was clearly expressed by Representative Hamilton Fish (R-New York) stating that he wanted to let the Democratic majority understand that even though the Spanish Civil War

was a terrible situation "the people back home are much more interested in our own safety and in keeping the United States of America out of all wars (Taylor, F., 1971:40,41)."

The United States adopted a neutrality stance during the Spanish Civil War. In the years 1935-1937, the isolationist viewpoint in the U.S. worked its way into neutrality legislation in an attempt to prevent the country from entering another global conflict. The first Neutrality Act became law on August 31, 1935 following Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia (Taylor, F., 1971:43). This neutrality position precluded any sales of arms and supplies to the Republic. No amount of protest by the Spanish embassy had any effect upon the United States' decision. When some American citizens began to defy the neutrality embargo, the U.S. government undertook further legislation to stop arms sales and passed the Spanish Embargo Act on January 6, 1937 which prohibited the sale of munitions to either side and limited loans and credits to both sides (Cortada, 1978:187).

Summer Wells, an influential Assistant Secretary of State to the Roosevelt Administration during the time of the Spanish Civil War, later wrote that "of all our blind isolationist policies, the most disastrous was our attitude on the Spanish Civil War (Taylor, F., 1971:43)." Mr. Wells was correct. The embargo legislation, Washington's insistence of maintaining its neutrality stance throughout the war, and other foreign policy decisions, have limited the United States' ability to establish a good impression

with the Spanish populace over the past fifty years (Cortada, 1978:198-99).

Following the civil war, Spain effectively turned inward for many years in an effort to rebuild the nation and continue her domestic policies without any interference from foreign nations. Spain looked to the European Economic Recovery Plan as a way to receive the capital necessary to recover from the devastation of the civil war.

The Marshall Plan. The Spanish government drew up very optimistic plans for their utilization of funds coming from the Marshall Plan. The government in Madrid initially asked for \$451 million in aid, and later raised that request to \$676 million. Spain claimed that World War II had prevented her from making up the losses incurred in the civil war. Spain also maintained her civil war losses "included two-thirds of the nation's transport, one-third of its merchant marine, and virtually all of its consumer goods, raw materials, and gold reserves (Whitaker, 1961:33)." Spain also pointed to the one million killed and a half a million countrymen who were in a self-imposed exile as another reason that their nation was deserving of the relief funds. Spain also lost all of its foreign markets because of the country's need to use all of its available foreign exchange to purchase required consumer goods instead of machinery, fertilizers and other items necessary to produce an economic recovery (Whitaker, 1961:33-34).

The United States left the distribution of aid to its wartime European allies. When these European nations drew up the European Recovery Plan, Spain was excluded from the design. The American House of Representatives voted to include Spain in the Economic Cooperation Administration, a body set up to distribute the aid money; however President Truman disagreed with the idea and was supported by the Senate (Whitaker, 1961:34). The lack of support by the United States in the Marshall Plan, was just another stick to add to the fire of anti-Americanism in Spain.

United Nations Rejection. Initially, the Fascist policies of the Franco dictatorship were so unpalatable to the rest of the western world that the United States and the western European nations placed economic sanctions on Spain beginning soon after the conclusion of World War II and lasting until December of 1947. In February of 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations called upon all member nations to cut off relations with Spain (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:5). Finally, a United Nations resolution was passed on 12 December 1946 prohibiting Spain from obtaining U.N. membership. The United States, France, and Great Britain all voted along with the Soviet Union to pass the resolution. The opinions of the U.N. members changed very slowly over the next ten years and Spain was not granted membership in the General Assembly until 14 December 1955 (Whitaker, 1961:51).

1953 Pact of Madrid. A key factor in the legitimization of the fascist regime in Spain was the 1953 Pact of Madrid between the United States and Spain. This agreement marked the beginning of a new phase in U.S.-Spanish relations. This treaty provided the United States with military facilities in Spain in return for economic aid. These numerous military facilities were situated on one of the most coveted geographical locations in the Mediterranean. The agreement initiated the occupation of two key air bases at Torrejon and Zaragoza, the submarine and anti-submarine warfare base at Rota, and several other important installations throughout the peninsula (Harkavy, 1982:223).

Franco's Spain severely needed economic assistance and strongly desired to become integrated once again into the mainstream of European affairs (Cortada, 1978:223). The agreement between Franco and the U.S. poured millions of dollars into the Spanish economy over the years since the 1953 agreement, especially during the base construction years. The Pact of Madrid also began the initiation process of Spain's reacceptance by the rest of Western Europe.

The establishment of the U.S. military bases in Spain met with some opposition from groups within Spain. According to Whitaker, three groups stood out in their opposition to the bases. The nationalists opposed the "concession of bases to a foreign power and the presence of foreign troops on Spanish soil." The traditionalists

disapproved of the new connection between Spain and the United States, claiming the agreement "violated Spain's settled policy of neutrality and isolation." The third, and most vocal, group opposed to the agreement was the Catholic Church, which disapproved of the "concessions to, and contacts with Protestantism, implicit in the proposed relationship with the United States (Whitaker, 1961:41)." The control and authority Francisco Franco maintained over the country was so "complete and unchallengeable" that the opposition from the three groups was never a serious threat to the agreement. However, the feelings of opposition towards the United States and the U.S. bases in Spain have never left the Spanish people, especially since the agreement virtually assured the Fascist Franco would remain in control of the government of Spain. In a manner of speaking, Spain's oppressive government was given its so called "stamp of approval" by the West's largest superpower.

U.S. support for the Franco regime created many problems for the two nations to overcome now that the dictator has passed away. The current Prime Minister of Spain, Felipe Gonzalez, said in October 1981, "America helped Europe to free itself from fascism, and it not only did not help Spain but condemned it to dictatorship for many more years (Smith, 1989:210)." This remark from the leading politician in Spain, indicates some of the underlying tensions existing between the two nations.

The attitude towards Americans has not improved since the Socialist government came into power. In the spring of 1985, a public opinion poll was taken in Spain concerning the populace's attitude towards America. According to the poll, only 16% of the Spaniards considered America to be a good friend of Spain. Anti-Americanism was found to be especially strong among the under 25-year-olds and in the over 50-year-olds. For the past half a century, a strong dislike of Americans has been nurtured by two different groups: first, by the right-wing propagandists who blamed all the faults of the world outside of Spain on a "capitalist-liberal-Marxist conspiracy" organized in Washington and Moscow; and second, with more justification, by the Spanish democrats who were never able to forgive the United States for "lending General Franco international legitimacy by signing a defense pact with Spain in 1953 (Yanqui Go Home, 1985:53)."

Conclusions. The anti-American sentiment enjoys a long history in Spain. Ever since the birth of the United States of America, the two nations have usually been on opposite sides in world conflicts instead of being allies. Spaniards remember that it was the Americans who drove them from their North American holdings. Spaniards also remember that it was the Americans, who in the Spanish-American War of 1898, virtually eliminated Spanish involvement in the Caribbean Sea and the Philippine islands. Most importantly, the Spaniards remember that it was the American nation which

failed to come to their assistance during the Spanish Civil War and later lent legitimacy to the oppressive rule of Generalissimo Franco and the Falangists. Little wonder that hundreds of thousands have marched in Spain against the U.S. military installations and against Spain's membership in NATO, an organization who's cornerstone is the United States of America.

The Soviet Union

Relations between Spain and the Soviet Union have not been as extensive as those with the United States. For the purposes of this work we will concentrate on the two nations' interactions since the Spanish Civil War.

The Spanish Civil War. The only major European country willing to come to the aid of the Spanish Republic during the civil war was the Soviet Union. The Soviets took an interest early on in the Spanish conflict. The American Charge in Moscow sent a message to his superiors that the Soviet population was openly demonstrating their "sympathy for the Spanish Government as the latter's position becomes more precarious." He reported that over 200,000 people held demonstrations of solidarity for the Spanish people and that the Pravda claimed that money for the fighters against Franco's Nationalists was collected in factories as Soviet workers voted to donate "one-half to one per cent of their aggregate salaries to the cause (Taylor, F., 1971:56)."

Stalin came into the conflict with two objectives in mind. His primary goal was to oppose Hitler and discourage the Axis powers from expansion into Eastern Europe. Stalin also sought to support the Popular Front government to help communist expansion in Western Europe. As the war grew, the Soviets gained more influence in the Republic, and, in fact, the Spanish Civil War was viewed by many Europeans and Americans as "an international battle between the democracies and governments of the left and the fascist or dictatorial systems of the right for dominance in Europe (Cortada, 1978:190-1)." The willingness of the U.S.S.R. to come to the aid of Spain during the civil war reduced, in the eyes of many Spaniards, the image of the Soviet Union as the major threat to the Spanish populace.

From the commencement of the Spanish Civil War until his dying days, Franco claimed to be a staunch opponent of communism throughout the world and his country refused to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Soviets during his reign. It is interesting to note, however, that even though the Spanish government was very firm in its anti-communist stance, frequent contacts with Eastern bloc countries occurred. Spain was even denounced by the British United Nations delegate for her trade with communist Poland. Due to the economic problems in Spain, trade with communist countries never ceased during Franco's regime, even though Arab nations were often utilized as intermediaries (Alba, 1985:104).

The strategic location of the Iberian Peninsula has not been overlooked by the Soviets. Extensive efforts were undertaken by the leading nation of the Eastern bloc to establish military facilities in the western Mediterranean arena. In order to maintain constant surveillance of the United States' Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviets attempted to enter into negotiations with Spain with the hope of gaining naval port facilities. In 1969, Moscow pressed Spain to enter an arrangement that would have established a base at Alboran, an island about 150 miles east of Gibraltar. Even though base facilities were denied, a shipping agreement between the two nations was signed securing port facilities in Barcelona for Soviet merchant vessels (Vego, 1979:12).

Renewed Diplomatic Ties. In 1977, the year following the death of Franco, Spanish-Soviet diplomatic relations were once again established. Spain's desire to reestablish ties with the Soviet Union was due in part to a great desire to break the heavy bonds of isolationism which had enveloped the nation for so many years (Olgin, 1986:84).

Once diplomatic relations were reestablished between Spain and the U.S.S.R. in February 1977, the Soviets implemented a strong campaign to exert influence in Spain to preclude Spain's integration into the NATO alliance. Trade agreements were established sending Soviet machinery to Spain and Iberian steel, wine, and vegetable oil to the Soviet Union. The Soviets even attempted to enter into

contracts which would have been highly favorable to Spanish shipyards, based on the condition of Spain remaining outside of the NATO alliance (Roeder, 1977:37).

Moscow expressed stiff opposition to Spain's entrance into the NATO alliance. They claimed such an addition would upset the balance of forces in Europe and possibly accelerate the arms race to a point where the European security would be threatened. In order to stop NATO's expansion, one of the points continually mentioned by the Soviets was that further addition to NATO "would run directly counter to their proposed objective of the eventual military dissolution of the two blocs (What Role For Spain, 1982:139-142)."

Even though Spain ignored the promptings of the Soviet Union and elected to join the Atlantic alliance, relations between the two countries have continued to improve. In 1984, King Juan Carlos visited the Soviet Union and expressed his desire for extending contacts with the Soviets. This same year inter-parliamentary ties were established and over the following two years, meetings between parliamentary delegations from both countries enabled differing views to be shared on important "bilateral relations and key international issues (Olgin, 1986:84-89)." Even though the two nations are members of opposing alliances, both sides consider the issue of "mitigating world tensions" to be foremost in foreign policy matters.

Conclusion. Many Spaniards still believe the Soviet Union is a peaceful nation. The anti-Communist campaign carried on by Franco was extremely narrow-minded and prohibited the majority of Spaniards from actually coming to know the beliefs behind the Soviet system. The Spaniards in opposition to Franco's government viewed the Soviets as friendly towards a Spain without Franco. One must remember that Spain has not experienced the interaction with the Soviet Union that the rest of Western Europe has weathered. The people of Spain have not lived with the Soviet threat over the past forty years, a threat which in reality is the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance.

Western Europe

For many centuries, Spain was a 'Superpower' among European nations. As previously mentioned, when Spain lost her position as a world power she turned more inward and tended to ignore the demands of world politics. Since beginning to break out of her shell of isolationism, Spain has attempted to initiate better relations with the nations of Western Europe.

Great Britain. Over the centuries, Spain and Britain have maintained many levels of foreign policy, from outright warfare to being fairly close allies. These two nations have consistently experienced difficulties with their foreign relationship, due primarily to Gibraltar and the challenge to British sovereignty by the Spanish over the

'Rock'. Spaniards are unanimous in their desire to recover this piece of territory which they feel is rightfully theirs (Luria, 1982:1501).

The Rock of Gibraltar was obtained by England in 1704 during the War of Spanish Succession, and for the past three centuries the Spanish people have sought to regain this piece of Mediterranean property (Cortada, 1978:10). In 1713 the Treaty of Utrecht was signed acknowledging England's capture and possession of Gibraltar during the war. Article Ten of that treaty apparently relinquishes to Great Britain the rightful sovereignty of Gibraltar. The article reads as follows:

The Catholic King does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; and he gives up the said property to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without any exception and impediment whatsoever. (Fawcett, 1967:238)

Even though Article Ten of the treaty seems to be explicit with regards to the possession of Gibraltar, the Spanish are adamant about Gibraltar's return.

For many years, the topic of Gibraltar was maintained at a low level, until, in 1954, improved relations with Britain led the Franco government to vigorously renew its claim for Gibraltar. Great Britain has continued to refuse to turn 'The Rock' over to Spain. In fact, Gibraltar has become a national symbol for the British, and the saying 'Steady as the Rock' signifies national stability for many

British citizens. Gibraltar's strategic location at the crossroads between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean poses another important reason for the British to hold on to its Mediterranean possession (Sniffin, 1982:46-51).

While Franco was alive and in power, the British government "simply had no stomach" for the dictator and provided stiff resistance to Spanish claims for Gibraltar. Even when Spain brought the issue before the United Nations in 1963, claiming Great Britain was guilty of colonialism, the British government refused to yield. "Even when Spain maneuvered a favorable vote at the U.N., it was always conditioned on the opinion expressed by the Gibraltarians who, in 1967, voted overwhelmingly to remain British (12,153 to 44 votes) (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:59-60)."

Further agitation between these two nations occurred when Spain was caught in the middle of the 1982 Falkland Islands conflict. Spain found itself torn between Argentina, a longtime friend and ally, and its newly joined NATO alliance members. This conflict led to the cancellation of negotiations between the two nations which would open the Spanish-Gibraltar frontier at Algeciras, closed by Franco in 1968. These talks were finally held at a later date, and the border between Spain and Gibraltar was finally reopened in November 1984 (Luria, 1982:1501).

Spain could profit by noticing the parallelism between British possession of Gibraltar and Spanish possession of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast. Spain gained

a foothold in Melilla in 1470 and acquired Ceuta in 1688. Neither city has ever fallen from Spanish control, and yet both cities are claimed by Morocco in a similar fashion to Spain's claim on Gibraltar (Whitaker, 1961:322).

France. Spain places high emphasis on its relationship with France. One of the primary reasons for this interest in good relations stems from the fact that over the past few decades France became the third largest export market for Spanish goods as well as providing a sizeable job market for many of Spain's large, unemployed work force (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:62).

Problems between the two nations arose at times because, for many years, France contained the prime sanctuary for the Spanish terrorist group, ETA. This fact has always caused some tension between the leaders of Spain and France; however, since 1986, as a result of continued pressure from Spain and a desire on the part of both nations for improved relations, the Basque area of France is no longer the ETA hideaway it had been in the past (Sanchez Garcia, 1988:21).

France also opposed Spain's entrance into the European Common Market, primarily due to the high quality and lower prices of Spanish agriculture products and Spanish wine. France finally voted to support Spain's integration, after some restrictions pertaining to the free trade of Spanish products during the first five years of Spanish membership were imposed (Sanchez Garcia, 1988:22).

The Federal Republic of Germany. No history of war exists between Spain and Germany since the seventeenth century conflict against the German Protestant states. During the two World Wars of the twentieth century, Spain maintained a neutrality stance for the first, and was closely tied to Hitler's Germany in the second, although neutrality was again espoused. Spain avoided the experience of German occupation during World War II, unlike the majority of the European continent (Alba, 1980:103; Abril Martorell, 1988:42-44).

In the time period since the termination of World War II, many members of Spain's "Blue Division" have held influential positions within the Spanish government. The "Blue Division" was a volunteer force of Spaniards who fought alongside the German army on the Russian Front against the Soviets. Most Spaniards hold Germany in high esteem and greatly admire the miraculous recovery of the German economy after the devastation from the second world war.

Relations between Germany and Spain continued to improve even more since the rebirth of democracy in Spain. The Spanish Socialist Party has relied heavily upon the financial help received from the German Social Democrats. West Germany was also one of the staunchest supporters in receiving Spain into both NATO and the EEC in an effort to "build a more united Western Europe (Alba, 1980:104-106)."

Portugal. Relations between Spain and Portugal go back a very long time, and ever since the seventeenth century, when Portugal finally achieved her independence from Spain, there has existed in the minds of many Portuguese a suspicion of Spanish intentions.

Portugal utilized the strategic location of the Azores to become one of the founding nations of the NATO alliance, and even though she voted to allow Spain's entrance into NATO, 'understandable national reservations' were raised among the Portuguese people. Portugal made known the fact that she does not desire Spain to take over command of specific missions within the NATO command structure which would alter "in any fashion" Portugal's "own position and missions within IBERLANT (Pfaltzgraff and others, 1984:62-63). Both countries have been striving to improve relations, and the 1978 Treaty of Cooperation and friendship between the two young democracies helped close the gap in the differences between these two Iberian nations (Wigg, 1983:48).

Edward M. Sniffin, in his paper 'The International Politics of Spanish Accession to NATO,' sums up the foreign relations between Spain and Portugal quite nicely. He points out that historically the two nations have normally been on opposite sides of armed conflicts, and about the "only precedent for a true alliance between Spain and Portugal has been the personal alliance between the two Iberian dictators, Franco and Salazar (Sniffin, 1982:91)."

Even though it is in the better interests of both nations to work closely together "a strong tradition of competition and insecurity remains in the relationship (Sniffin, 1982:91)."

III. The Importance of Spain to NATO and of NATO to Spain

Spain's Importance to NATO

Was the addition of Spain to the Atlantic alliance important to alliance members, and did this addition improve the capabilities of the western alliance?

Western government spokesmen who supported Spanish entry into NATO espoused three reasons for admitting the nation into the alliance: "First, it will strengthen the alliance militarily; second, it will help consolidate Spanish democracy; and, third, it will add political weight to the anti-Soviet front (Carothers, 1981:301)."

The value of Spain's potential NATO military contribution to the central front was always considered to be of minimal value, due, primarily, to the fact that the Spanish army was equipped with military equipment a generation behind the rest of NATO. NATO's added military potential from Spain came from the Spanish air and naval forces and the key roles these troops could play by increasing western influence throughout the western Mediterranean (Hanel, 1984:10).

The existence of non-democratic governments in NATO countries throughout the history of the alliance must raise questions as to the validity of NATO membership being a key to maintaining the internal political stability in Spain.

This point will be covered more completely in the section on the importance of NATO to Spain.

Undoubtedly the most significant benefit to NATO at the time of Spain's admittance to the organization was political in nature. Western Europe demonstrated to the world that the democratic way of life was still worth defending. NATO believed it to be very important to be able to firmly count on Spain as one of the leading proponents of democracy in the North Atlantic. At the same time, Spain felt it was equally important to be counted among the North Atlantic's prominent democracies (Treverton, 1981:31).

Military Factors. On paper, the Spanish armed forces look impressive. Spain fields a standing army of approximately 330,000 men on active duty and another one million on reserve status. These two figures rank seventh and second, respectively, in the alliance (Corral, 1987:5). At the time of Spain's entrance into NATO, Spain's armed services were composed of a force designed to "provide territorial protection for Spain and its possessions." These troops possessed minimal ability to provide any direct assistance to NATO's central front (Hielberg, 1983:14).

The Spanish army takes up 75 percent of the manpower available for the armed services. The 240,000 man army is composed of approximately 50,000 professional and volunteer soldiers with the remainder of the force being made up of conscripts serving an obligatory 15-18 months in the service. One of the major problems encountered in the

Spanish military is the overabundance of very old senior officers. It is not unusual to find 'crack formations' being commanded by an officer who is 70 years old or older. In addition, senior Spanish officers upon reaching the rank of Lieutenant Colonel rarely participate in military exercises testing their competence to lead forces into battle. Therefore, efficiency and competence at the upper levels of Spain's armed forces suffer (Klepak, 1980:38-39).

Another factor limiting Spain's contribution to NATO's military proficiency is the condition of the weapons utilized by the armed forces. Spain's military equipment is generally a generation behind that of NATO's principal members and primarily consists of second hand American and French equipment. It must be noted, however, that even though Spanish equipment is not up to the standards of the United States and other northern European nations, Spain's forces are equipped similar to other southern members of the alliance such as Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Italy (Hanel, 1984:11).

The Spanish government recognized many of the problems and limitations within its nation's armed forces and has undertook major steps to improve the situation. New weapons acquisition programs are ongoing within Spain to enhance the nation's defense capabilities in a manner tailored to combat the possible threats from the Eastern bloc and North Africa (Pfaltzgraff and others, 1984:47). The army focused on trimming its size by 90,000 men in order to become a more

compact and efficient fighting force. The top priorities of the ground forces have been the modernization of its tank forces and armored personnel carriers to become more mobile. The army has also implemented a system to improve Spain's "antiair point defense." The Spanish naval forces based their future on developing a viable combat group centered around the new aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias and three new FFG frigates. The Spanish air force has been replacing the aging F-4C aircraft with 72 F-18 fighter aircraft purchased from the United States (Pfaltzgraff and others, 1984:47-49).

Spain's armed forces did not translate into an immediate gain for NATO; however, the effort by the Spanish government to improve the capabilities of the military services will enable both Spain and NATO to realize the military potential of NATO's sixteenth nation.

Geographical Benefits. The primary strategic value of adding Spain to the alliance was geographical. The location of the Iberian peninsula will always be extremely important to forces "protecting the approaches to the Mediterranean and the routes of resupply from the United States to Europe (Treverton, 1981:31)." Spain's location places the nation's area of naval influence at an "important world crossroads which witnesses the great naval deployments belonging to many different countries (Nardiz Vidal, 1989:76)."

Many of the primary sea lanes through which Europe receives supplies converge in the area of Spain. The

Spanish peninsula, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, and Spain's African possessions of Ceuta and Melilla form a great strategic axis joining the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as well as Europe and Africa. The focal point of this axis is the Gibraltar Strait (Nardiz Vidal, 1989:76). The necessity of maintaining and defending the sea lines is imperative in times of war and the inclusion of Spain into NATO enhances the alliances' ability to keep the western sea lanes open.

The NATO alliance looked for Spain to improve alliance control over the strategic lines of communication in both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Spanish maritime capabilities range from naval and merchant fleets to key deep-water ports and ship repair facilities in both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The geographical position of Spain also enables land based aircraft to maintain surveillance over large portions of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. These aircraft and the rest of the Spanish air defense forces improve the ability of NATO to protect the southern front of the alliance (Eleta, 1986:9).

Spain dominates the Strait of Gibraltar by controlling both the eastern and western approaches to the waterway (see Figure 2). Spain's influence in the Mediterranean is high because of its more than 1500 kilometers of coastline along the sea and the numerous ports along the Spanish coastline that lend great flexibility to maritime patrols. The location of the Balearic Islands in the very heart of the




Figure 2 Spain's Strategic Geographical Location

western Mediterranean adds to Spain's ability to improve NATO control of the Mediterranean. Spain's dominance over the Strait of Gibraltar stems from the fact that Spain maintains control of the island of Alboran on the western side of the Strait, and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, which are both situated along the northern coast of Africa.

Although these two North African enclaves are not included in NATO's area of responsibility, the cities' strategic position in Spain's defense plans and policies improves the alliance's ability to ensure the southern region's strategic sea lines of communication are always kept open (Corral, 1987:3-4).

Even though the NATO treaty does not extend to cover the Canary Islands, by including Spain within the alliance, the ability to extend NATO's sphere of influence to the region of the Canary Islands is enhanced. The strategic location of these islands off the coast of Africa offer the ability to protect important sea lines of communications as well as to monitor the shipping lanes between Europe and the Cape of Good Hope (What Role for Spain, 1982:140).

In addition to the advantages afforded NATO on the seas, Spain provides other benefits because of her geography. With Spain, NATO adds a 'geographical depth' to the alliance. In the possibility of a protracted war in Europe, Spain could provide some relief to the congestion of NATO's primary reinforcement ports and airfields. Increased flexibility is also added in planning for logistical support as well since Spain could be utilized as a prime staging area for reinforcements (Alford, 1982:385).

In the event of a prolonged conflict with the Eastern bloc, Spain offers key advantages to the alliance. Spain is protected from the rest of Europe by the Pyrenees mountain range, the only natural barrier to stop invading troops

after crossing the Rhine as the invading forces head West and South (Suanzes de la Hidalga, 1982:80).

The topographical features of Spain facilitate defending the country from invading troops. Besides the Pyrenees mountains, the Cantabrian Range is another deterrence to opposing forces. Even though Spain is virtually surrounded by water, very few locations exist that offer suitable terrain for an invading force. The air distances from Eastern Europe to central Spain are approximately 2000 miles, requiring attacking aircraft to pass through the heart of NATO's anti-aircraft defenses (Corral, 1987:4). This added depth to the NATO alliance would allow for the organization of defense echelons and the utilization of Spanish ports and airfields as a jumping off point for naval, air and ground operations (Suanzes de la Hidalga, 1982:80).

Gregory Treverton, in his article "The Strategic Importance of the Iberian Peninsula," suggests the strategic importance of the Iberian peninsula might not be as significant as some believe. He states that in a full-scale war the majority of the naval engagements would probably be fought in the eastern Mediterranean. He also believes that in a short-term major conflict, the type most current-day strategists predict will occur, the strategic importance of the Strait of Gibraltar will not be extremely significant. Treverton does agree that if a European war is

long and drawn out, the importance of Iberia will greatly increase (Treverton, 1981:31).

Political Considerations. The addition of Spain into the alliance was important to NATO in two political areas. The first point was that NATO demonstrated to the world that its organization was desirable to other nations who felt as if the principles of democracy and freedom were worth standing up for. NATO was able to show to the world the fact "that it is a club that others want to join (Alford, 1982:385)." The second point was that NATO demonstrated its potential for growth, whereas the Warsaw Pact could not easily do so. This was the major reason behind the Soviet Union consistently pushing for an agreement calling for non-enlargement of the two military pacts (Alford, 1982:385).

Spanish membership in the alliance held the possibility of strengthening NATO's position in the Mediterranean due to Spain's favorable relationships with the Arab world. Since the days of Franco, the Spanish government worked to improve its foreign relations with the Arab states. The ability to bring Spain's favorable relations with the Arab world into the NATO alliance presented an opportunity to help the North Atlantic alliance to further spread its influence throughout the world (What Role for Spain, 1982:139).

NATO's Importance to Spain

Two of the major foreign policy questions facing Spain after the death of Franco and the nation's venture into a

democracy were entrance into both the Common Market and the NATO Alliance. When Spain was finally rid of Franco's dictatorship and the UCD government was elected in June 1977, the Prime Minister of the young democratic government, Adolfo Suarez, identified the primary foreign policy objective of his government to be joining the European Economic Community (Smith, 1989:211). After the Suarez government stepped down, the new Spanish government under the direction of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo was formed in January 1981. The new leadership reaffirmed that the primary foreign policy objective of the new administration was entrance into the Common Market. A few months later the principal objective of Calvo Sotelo's government shifted direction to gaining entrance into the NATO alliance (Will Spain Deign, 1981:43).

Spanish Coup Attempts. One of the reasons for the modification in objectives centered around the strong belief held by the Calvo Sotelo government that membership in NATO would reduce the risk of another attempted army coup in the country. Coup attempts by sections of the armed forces were foiled in their early stages in November 1978 and January 1980. The most serious attempt was made on February 23, 1981, when Colonel Tejero stormed the Cortes and held the deputies hostage (Alba, 1985:108-109). Inclusion in the NATO alliance was to help solidify the democratic process in the country.

The Spanish government argued that revitalizing the Spanish armed forces would remove the military leaders from the political scene (Treverton, 1981:30-31). Calvo Sotelo's ministers reasoned that by providing training courses and new areas of interest for the large number of "under-employed" Spanish officers, and by teaching them how to concentrate and deal with the Soviet threat to Europe, these same officers would then have less time and desire to direct their irritation against the government (Will Spain Deign, 1981:43)."

EEC Membership. In 1977, the Suarez government recognized the fact that Spain needed to become integrated into the Common Market in order to fully belong to the "community of European democracies," and to be successful in accomplishing Spain's long-range economical development plans (Smith, 1989:211).

The early years of Spain's quest for entry into the Common Market were dominated by the opposition of France and Italy towards Spanish agriculture producers. Other EEC members feared Europe's trade system would be disrupted by the introduction of Spanish agricultural and wine products. In June 1980, France called for a hold to be placed on the Spanish application process "until the Community had adjusted so as to make Spanish membership harmless to French interests (Treverton, 1988:124)."

According to Treverton, French opposition to Spanish EEC membership was another one of the main reasons for the

Spanish government's move to bring Spain into the NATO alliance. The two issues, NATO and the Common Market, had often been linked in the Spanish public's eye, and the government entered into the military alliance with the hope NATO membership would put "pressure on France to move forward with the EC negotiations (Treverton, 1988:124)."

In 1981, the Spanish Cortes passed the resolution which allowed the government to apply for membership in NATO. This resolution began with a statement of "the desirability of Spain becoming integrated into the political, economic and defense structure of the Western World (Eleta, 1986:16)." Spain's government believed participating in the defense of Western Europe would facilitate entrance into Western Europe's economic circle as well.

Even though the perceived linkage between NATO and the Common Market is unsubstantiated by the fact that Portugal, a founding NATO member, was not a member of the EEC, or that Ireland a member of the EEC, was not a member of NATO, confusion over the issue was introduced by various leaders of other European nations and by the EEC ambassadors themselves. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany and Prime Minister Bettino Craxi of Italy both explicitly linked the two items together, stating "security interests were inseparable from economic interests in building a strong Europe." In fact, Chancellor Kohl reportedly told a group of Spanish journalists that Spain "can't hope to sell olives in the European Market and not contribute to European

defense (Darnton, 1984:I-14)." The EEC ambassadors strongly linked the two organizations together by telling Felipe Gonzalez, in a meeting shortly after his party came into power, that "leaving NATO would prejudice negotiations on entering the EEC (Smith, 1989:212)."

The NATO-EEC connection was a two way lever for the Gonzalez government. Spain's continued NATO membership was used as a ploy to influence negotiations with the EEC. In fact, Gonzalez reportedly claimed that "the wording of the proposed referendum on NATO could depend on how the EC negotiations progressed (Treverton, 1988:125)." Spanish government officials "repeatedly stated that it would be unthinkable that Spain remained in the Alliance if it were excluded from the European Community (Sanchez Gijon, 1983:43)." At the same time, Gonzalez was holding up the EEC as an incentive to Spaniards for remaining within NATO. He looked for entry into the Common Market to help quiet the opposition within Spain over NATO membership.

Negotiations concerning Spain's membership in NATO were concluded in March 1985 and a treaty was signed in June of the same year, to become effective in January 1986. The Spanish government worked to conclude these negotiations before scheduling the referendum in case the Spanish population voted against NATO and the EEC members decided to vote against a "non-NATO Spain (Smith, 1989:214)."

Whether or not the European Economic Community members would have decided against allowing Spain to enter into the

Common Market is something which will probably never be known; however, the possibility was tangible in the minds of Spanish government leaders. These same Spanish officials looked upon NATO membership as one of the means enabling Spain to become fully integrated into the economic structure of Western Europe.

Spanish Defense Benefits. One of the key benefits resulting from Spain's accession into NATO was the acceleration of an armed forces modernization program by the Spanish government in an effort to vastly improve Spain's outdated military equipment. Selection of the American made F/A-18 by the Spanish air force to replace aging F-4Cs and F-5s will improve Spain's air defense system and has been considered to be a key step in the armed forces modernization program. This program also calls for 24 Mirage F-1 fighters, two P-3C Orion aircraft and 17 Hughes 300C helicopters. The army purchased 200 French-built AMX-30 tanks, M-113 armored personnel carriers and 50 helicopters. The military equipment for the Spanish armed forces was selected in order to be standardized with other NATO countries (Kozicharow, 1982:46).

Membership in the alliance was also expected to bolster Spain's defense industry which, at the time of the nation's admittance to NATO, lagged far behind most NATO nations. The majority of defense equipment used in Spain is of either U.S. or French origin. NATO membership was expected to improve the technological capabilities of the industry and

stimulate military industrial research because of the modernization program of Spain's armed forces (Kozicharow, 1982:47). According to Eleta, Spain's membership in NATO paid off big dividends for the defense industry. Since joining the alliance, Spain's defense industry has reaped benefits in the areas of "weapon's production cooperation, licenses for the construction of military equipment, technological and military industrial cooperation, and a bigger share of the profits from arm sales (Eleta, 1986:16)."

Reduce Dependency on U.S.. Spain looked for membership in NATO to allow the nation to regain influence in European affairs and to gain recognition as a democratic nation. Spain was also trying to find a method to reduce its dependency on the United States (Eleta, 1982:4). Spain's right-wing government also requested membership in the Atlantic alliance because Spanish leaders hoped "alliance membership would be a significant improvement on the long-standing treaty with the United States." These remarks were made by Spain's Foreign Minister responding to a campaign by the Socialists' to renew the American base rights but remaining outside of NATO. Calvo Sotelo's government maintained that membership in NATO would finally "give Spain a voice of its own in Europe" especially since Spain, in their opinion, had been "a de facto alliance member through its agreement with the United States (Markhan, 1981)."

Spain's Defense Priorities. In an interview with NATO's Fifteen Nations, Alberto Oliart Saussol, Spain's Defense Minister under Calvo Sotelo, said Spain's entrance into the NATO alliance would not drastically change Spain's defensive priorities. He assumed entering into the alliance would bring about military advantages to Spain due to their "participation in a wider sphere which would allow access to and comparison of doctrines, procedures, information, weapons and material, training, and logistical possibilities, which would in turn improve the effectiveness of the Spanish armed forces (Treverton, 1981:40)."

Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands. Since the time of Franco, the Spanish military has primarily been concerned with maintaining internal order within the nation's boundaries. Spain's perception of an external threat is different from the alliance's threat perception. The country does not consider the Eastern bloc to be a threat to its nation's freedom (Treverton, 1981:31).

Spaniards watch for a threat from the south, in possible conflicts between themselves and North Africa over the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla as well as the Canary Islands. Spain entered into the alliance hoping membership would dispel some of the agitation between Morocco and the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as solidify her control over the Canary Islands (Treverton, 1981:31). The military heads in Spain are not convinced they could resist a Moroccan offensive to retake

Ceuta and Melilla. In the mid-70s, Spain's army was unable to turn back Morocco's offensive to seize the Western Sahara, which was Spain's most valuable mineral resource. Even though the NATO treaty only requires fellow members to provide assistance if the attack occurs in Europe or North America, according to The Economist, Spain might expect her allies to come to her aid in a conflict with Morocco in a manner similar to the aid given Great Britain in her dispute over the Falkland Islands (Ask Not Only, 1982:47).

To understand Spain's threat perceptions, it is imperative to realize that Spanish defense ideas come from recent historical experiences in North Africa, and the current "unstable Maghreb." One of the primary reasons furnished by Spanish Socialists for Spanish non-participation in NATO, dealt with the fact that Spain's North African possessions do not fall under the alliance agreement (Sanchez Gijon, 1981:46).

Antonio Sanchez Gijon writes that Spain's "North African syndrome" has been very closely tied to the idea of isolationism from the rest of Western Europe and ignores western interest in the stability of the Maghreb area (Sanchez Gijon, 1981:46). The western world's interest in the stability of the Maghreb offers Spain a great opportunity to participate in an important peacekeeping role in the region with the backing of the NATO alliance.

The Bay of Biscay. Spanish defense plans do not focus heavily on the Bay of Biscay zone, a area of interest

for NATO. The center of Spanish naval strategy revolves around an "imaginary axis" which is made up of the Canary Islands, the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Balearic Islands. Admiral Cardinal offers his point of view that although "a natural base for operational control of a wide area of the Atlantic is found in the northwestern region on the Galician coast," a region vital to the NATO alliance, Spain does not show extreme interest in that region because of a "strictly national point of view" which shows an extremely "limited threat to that region (De Salas Cardinal, 1984:87).

The Rock of Gibraltar. The Rock of Gibraltar, which Spain labeled "the last colony in Europe," and Great Britain's continuing dominion over the Rock, comprised another reason for Spain to join the Atlantic alliance. The quarrel between Spain and Britain is one of Europe's oldest, and the Spanish government harbored the hope that by entering NATO the alliance could become the forum for returning sovereignty of Gibraltar to Spain (Markham, 1981).

Political Debate Over Alliance Advantages

The domestic rivalry between the two primary political parties in Spain became extremely heated during the period of debate over entrance into the alliance. The right-wing UCD made four claims espousing the advantages of Spain's entrance into NATO: "that NATO membership would smooth entry into the European Community; that it would increase Spanish national security; that it would be a natural

extension of Spain's bilateral agreement with the United States; and, finally, that it would strengthen Spanish democracy (Carothers, 1981:299)."

The UCD proposed that once a member of Europe's military alliance, the Economic Community would not be able to refuse Spain's entrance into the EEC. The PSOE and other left-wing parties questioned the existence of any evidence that pointed to a link between NATO membership and EEC membership. The denial of EEC membership to Portugal, one of NATO's initial members, was a case often cited by the Spanish left (Carothers, 1981:299).

The view that Spanish national security would be improved because the country would be part of a large "defense guarantee" with powerful nations was questioned by the left wing parties. The Left believed no external threat for Spanish national security existed. They argued that membership in the alliance would actually decrease security because of the possibility that Spain could easily become involved in international conflicts they might otherwise have avoided. The Socialists also brought up the argument that Spain might also become a nuclear target due to her involvement in the NATO alliance (Carothers, 1981:300).

The UCD claimed the bilateral agreement with the United States was a stepping stone towards membership in the alliance. In this view, NATO entry was "a long intended evolution of the U.S. agreement made possible now by the post-Franco establishment of Spanish democracy." The

Socialists contended that a major difference with NATO membership would be that Spain would then be obligated to come to the defense of member nations; whereas, under the U.S. bilateral agreement Spain was considered a neutral country (Carothers, 1981:300).

The final claim, that NATO membership would solidify democracy in Spain, was also fiercely disputed by the Left. The UCD held the view that "membership in the Atlantic Alliance would mean joining a group of fellow democracies which would confer legitimization and give support to the green institution of Spanish democracy." The Socialists challenged this view by pointing to NATO members such as Portugal, Greece and Turkey and the harsh dictatorships which were evident in these countries while they have retained their memberships in NATO. Spanish opponents to NATO were quick to point out that these dictatorial regimes were not "hindered in the acquisition and maintenance of power by their NATO memberships (Carothers, 1981:300)."

IV. The Socialists' Position

Beginning in 1939, when Francisco Franco's dictatorial rule of Spain began, until his death in 1975, opposing political party members were either underground in Spain or living in exile outside of Spanish borders. Prior to 1972, principal leaders of the Spanish Socialist party, such as Indalecio Prieto and Rodolfo Llopis, continuously extolled the virtues of a democratic Spanish nation participating in the NATO alliance. This was the same view espoused by other European socialists, such as Bevin, who had been instrumental in the initial creation of the NATO alliance. In 1972, the composition of the leadership of the Spanish Socialist party changed from a relatively moderate viewpoint to a much more radical position. In just a few short years, the Socialists' attitude towards NATO shifted from solid support to staunch condemnation. The new Socialist leadership "associated NATO with militarism and viewed it as an obstacle to the creation of a socialist society (Tusell, 1988:12-13)."

The new leadership in the Socialist party aligned their party more to the left than the other socialist parties throughout Western Europe. This attitude is thought to have developed because of the close contact the exiled socialists maintained with other exiled radical leftist parties throughout the reign of the Franco government. During the

initial years after Franco's death, the PSOE called for active Spanish neutrality, expanded relationships with Eastern bloc countries, strong initiatives on arms control and nuclear disarmament, and reduced U.S. involvement in Spain (Klepak, 1980:55).

In a speech to the Cortes in June 1977, Felipe Gonzalez expressed that the PSOE wanted "our country to adopt a position of active neutrality, outside bloc politics, that will favor authentically the policy of detente and international peace (Klepak, 1980:139)." In December 1977, Sr. Gonzalez, on the behalf of the PSOE, traveled to Moscow and entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union committing the Socialist party to labor against the "aggrandizement of military blocs." The conviction held by the Socialists at this time, as expressed by Fernando Moran, was that military blocs tend to globalize local or regional conflicts and force bloc members to become involved in the "broader East-West conflict (Spanish Perspectives, 1984:44)."

The Socialists' NATO Opposition. Before 1981, the hard-line anti-NATO movement in Spain was led by parties to the left of the PSOE. Early 1981 was the time period when the anti-NATO campaign gained momentum in the Socialist party because the PSOE decided to integrate the movement's goals in the party's election campaign (Prevost, 1985/86:351). The PSOE became the strongest voice in Spain against membership in NATO, an institution perceived by the

party as a "force of reaction on the world scene (Klepak, 1980:55)."

The dislike and distrust of NATO, again, developed from the many years of Socialist exile, and the close working relationship between the exiled Spanish and Portuguese Socialist parties. For the Portuguese Socialists, NATO was identified as the instrument that maintained Salazar's extreme rightist regime in power. Spanish Socialists took this view to heart and developed a strong antipathy towards the Alliance (Klepak, 1980:55). Victor De La Serna points out in his article "Spain's New Approach - Atlantic Solidarity" that Socialist opposition to NATO stems from the bitterness caused by the lack of effort on the part of NATO members to pressure the Franco government into pursuing a more moderate position, especially during the years after the signing of the Pact of Madrid with the United States (De La Serna, 1988:56).

When the Centre Democratic Union (UCD) government announced that Spain would seek to enter the NATO alliance, the government did so because of the UCD party's perception of Spain as a western European nation whose future was tied to its integration into the Atlantic alliance. The PSOE argued, at the time, that Spain's ties to Latin America and the Arab community were as equally important as the nation's relationship with Western Europe. The Socialist party initially advocated Spain follow an "active neutralist stance" in which Spain would encourage economic relations

with Western Europe and eventually join the EEC but would remain politically neutral and outside NATO (Carothers, 1981:298-9).

The Socialists staunchly opposed the Centrist government's decision to take Spain into the NATO alliance. The PSOE was very successful in utilizing the UCD's NATO decision as a rallying cry to bring their party into power. The November 1981 anti-NATO demonstration during which Felipe Gonzalez spoke to approximately 500,000 Spaniards about his disapproval of the UCD's NATO plans, marked the initiation of his election campaign for leadership in Spain (Prevost, 1985/86:352).

Interestingly enough, the Socialists refused to discuss the NATO topic with the ruling party at the time when Spain was brought into the alliance. The PSOE adopted the position that if Spain "joined the alliance by a majority vote, they (the PSOE) would withdraw with a majority vote when they came to power (Sanchez Gijon, 1986:80)."

In the 29th Congress of the PSOE, in October 1981, the official party line was the opposition of Spanish membership in NATO. This opposition was based on four items:

1. NATO does not guarantee Spanish territorial integrity because the North Atlantic Treaty excludes part of our territory from the Atlantic defensive system.
2. NATO does not cover our security and defence needs, given that the risk and threat theaters are beyond the area contemplated in the treaty.
3. Participation in NATO means an increase in the risk of nuclear destruction of our people.

4. The extension of NATO to Spain would provoke the other bloc's reaction, the strengthening or enlargement of the Warsaw Pact, increase of tension and the risks of war. (Sanchez Gijon, 1983:41-42)

The PSOE utilized the political campaign before the 1982 national elections to voice their displeasure over NATO membership. A poll taken in 1975 indicated fifty-seven percent of the Spanish population favored Spanish participation in the NATO alliance with only twenty-four percent of the people directly opposed to the idea of Spain in NATO (Tusell, 1988:16). The PSOE's crusade against NATO membership was so effective that every poll taken from the beginning of the Socialists' rule in 1982 up until the time of the referendum in March of 1986 indicated a majority of the Spanish population would vote to leave NATO if the opportunity presented itself (Tusell, 1988:17).

During the campaign, the Socialist party strongly criticized the UCD government for affiliating Spain with the Atlantic alliance. Socialist leaders told their countrymen that Spain's membership in NATO placed their country in "peril from the Warsaw Pact." The Spanish people were also told if Spain remained within the alliance their sons would perform military service in Turkey, Greece and other far away nations. The Gibraltar issue was also brought into play by pointing out that if Spain remained a member of NATO some of the Spanish armed forces would fall under the command of a British Admiral in Gibraltar, an idea totally unacceptable to most Spaniards (Corral, 1987:13).

Entrance into NATO forced the Spanish Socialists to alter their position on the issue. The Socialists election platform for the 1982 general elections took two major stands on the NATO topic: first, the PSOE would cease Spanish military integration into the alliance; and, second, the party would hold a referendum on Spain's NATO membership. The PSOE declared the need for a referendum based on their claim that important national issues should take public opinion into account (Chipman, 1988:162) The platform adopted by the Socialists stressed the importance of holding a referendum on the NATO question, versus taking a non-movable position on the withdrawal of Spain from the Alliance. This point is important since it implies that the PSOE's strong opposition to NATO membership in 1981-82 was possibly just "political opportunism (Prevost, 1985/86:352)."

Felipe Gonzalez explained to a New York Times journalist, shortly after taking power, that Spain, under Socialist rule, would look to Spain's own defense needs before becoming "a subsidiary of NATO." Sr. Gonzalez went on to explain that:

for us, there is a defense axis from Gibraltar to the Canaries and Gibraltar to the Balearic islands, an axis which crosses the southern flank of the peninsula. To submit our armed forces to the control of others to defend our priority defense flank is intolerable from the national point of view. (Komisar, 1982:31)

Sr. Gonzalez claimed Spain's defense needs did not coincide with those of the rest of Europe. He did concede;

however, that Spain would come to the defense of a threat to the Western world but that he did not want his country "ceding independence and sovereignty before its own defense needs (Komisar, 1984:31). When the Socialists came into power in 1982, party leaders were required to analyze the difference between not entering the alliance and deciding to withdraw from the alliance. The differences between the two decisions and the varying repercussions caused by each decision were considered under a different light once the PSOE was firmly in control of the Spanish government (Chipman, 1988:162).

The Socialists' Attitude Begins to Change. The PSOE actually maintained its official opposition stance to Spain's NATO membership for an extremely short period of time. This opposition dated from Felipe Gonzalez's consolidation of power within the party in 1972 until mid-1983 when the Gonzalez government first showed signs of lessened hostility towards NATO. Gonzalez rode the crest of the anti-NATO wave into office in 1982 calling the alliance "nothing more than a military superstructure built by the Americans to guarantee the survival of capitalism (Socialist Review, 1988:53)." Once in office, the realities of western European and world politics began to soften Gonzalez's view.

In an interview shortly before taking office, Gonzalez said "we have never been opposed to NATO. What we are against is Spain's joining NATO (Darnton, 1984:I-14)." In the time since taking office, Sr. Gonzalez has tempered his

remarks to a degree. He started his change by remarking that "Spain was irretrievably a Western country, a loyal ally." He also noted that Spain had already contributed to the defense of the West for three decades through the bilateral defense agreement with the United States. In December 1983, Sr. Gonzalez stated "as things are here and now, Spain cannot be a neutral country (Darnton, 1984:I-14)." And finally, in the Spring of 1984, the Spanish Prime Minister voiced his opinion by saying "Spain belongs to NATO but isn't militarily integrated into it. In my opinion, our position is extraordinarily comfortable (Darnton, 1984:I-14)."

Prime Minister Gonzalez softened his hard-line anti-NATO posture after being exposed to the politics of the 'real world.' On 2 February, 1986, before the Spanish Cortes, he publicly admitted that "after four years in the Alliance, and after the experience in the European Community, I say I have changed. I have been forced to change. Our autonomy has not suffered at all...not even our relations with the East have suffered (Sanchez Gijon, 1986:80)."

Reasons for the Socialists' Change. Although the Socialists have reversed their perspective on NATO membership, Spain's membership in the alliance stands for some primary objectives that are different for Spain than for other alliance participants. The Socialists in Spain finally took to the alliance as a means to find "solidarity

with Europe." Sr. Sanchez Gijon wrote that those "intellectuals" in Spain, who spoke out in favor of Spain's membership, pointed to Spanish membership in NATO "as an opportunity to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, thus weakening the transatlantic connection and eventually making possible a Europe independent of the blocs (Sanchez Gijon, 1986:80)."

Different reasons have been offered to explain the sharp transformation in policy with regards to Spanish membership in NATO. One such reason was the close tie between NATO and EEC memberships. Shortly after coming to office, Sr. Gonzalez met with the EEC ambassadors. He later told his friends he was surprised at "the vehemence with which they insisted that leaving NATO would prejudice negotiations on entering the EEC (Smith, 1989:212)." Three years later, the Socialist government brought up the close tie between NATO and the EEC in an attempt to influence public opinion in favor of a 'Yes' vote for the referendum, an institution of direct democracy where the nation's voters determine national policy on a specific issue. In Spain's referendum, the issue was continued membership in the NATO alliance.

Soon after the incident with the EEC ambassadors, a joint U.S.-Moroccan military exercise was held off the coast of North Africa near Ceuta and Melilla. Although similar exercises frequently occurred, according to Dan Smith in his book Pressure: How America Runs NATO, the Spanish

government perceived the joint exercise to be a hint that a possible consequence of taking Spain out of NATO would be U.S. support for Morocco's claims on the two Spanish enclaves in North Africa (Smith, 1989:212).

Another one of the reasons for the change in attitude by the Socialist party was the announcement of a treaty of union, including a mutual defense accord, between Morocco and Libya in August 1984. According to the New York Times, this treaty increased Spanish concerns about their ability to maintain the defense of the Strait of Gibraltar. Morocco assured the Spanish government the treaty was not directed against Spain; however, leaders of the Socialist party considered the pact to be another reason for Spain to remain in NATO (Shumacher, 1984a:I-5).

Major Fernando Riballi, a plans officer for the Spanish army, claimed the armed forces were required to review and rework Spain's overall defense strategy because the combined strength of Libya and Morocco surpassed the military capabilities of Spain. The major stated that "transferring the problem to the Atlantic alliance, whose Mediterranean strategy has been based on dominating the Strait," would be the most logical solution for Spain, because of the possible compromise to the security of the Strait of Gibraltar (Shumacher, 1984a:I-5).

The Spanish Socialist party slowly accepted NATO membership for their country. Sr. Sanchez Gijon divided the Socialist's stance into four separate motivations:

1. Political expediency in the quest of stronger ties with the EEC's more powerful countries in order to strengthen Spanish European policies.
2. The fear of being isolated from allied consultative bodies, thus renouncing valuable information.
3. The aspiration to loosen the ties binding European security to that of the USA.
4. The hope of bringing about what they call "the dissolution of the blocs and bloc politics." (Sanchez Gijon, 1986:80)

The Socialists' Change. The change in the Spanish Socialist government's push for withdrawal was discernable from the public statements of a number of high officials in the government, "a pattern of promotions of NATO-minded officers in the military", and the press reports tying the ongoing modernization of the Spanish armed forces to continued alliance membership (Darnton, 1984:I-14).

The switch in the government's position occurred at a time when pacifism and a powerful anti-NATO/American sentiment was on the rise in the country. Numerous demonstrations occurred in Madrid with protesters marching through the city calling for the nation's withdrawal from the NATO alliance as well as demanding the dismantling of the major U.S. military installations in the country. In May 1984, an estimated 100,000 people marched through the capital. Included in the march were key members of the Socialist party such as Enrique Tierno, the Mayor of Madrid, although officially the Socialist party boycotted the demonstration (Darnton, 1984:I-14).

The participation of key Socialist party members in anti-NATO demonstrations after the NATO position had been reversed by party leadership indicates one of the major problems associated with the policy shift. Accompanying the position change was a requirement to convince the Socialist party members to back a pro-NATO stance. On December 15, 1984, delegates at the Socialist party's national convention voted several times against various proposals calling for the withdrawal from NATO. Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez spoke to the convention's delegates on two separate occasions exerting them to support his view on Spain's position and future in Europe. He said that "Our project is to participate in Western Europe, in its destiny and its future. That requires a definition and that definition requires participation in European security." Gonzalez stated withdrawing from NATO and totally dismantling the military bases "would amount to an irresponsible neutralism and unattainable pacifism." The Prime Minister closed by saying "I am truly a pacifist, but, the experience of Western Europe has been that a security alliance is necessary." The final vote, after four hours of debate, was 2-to-1 in favor of remaining a member of the alliance (Shumacher, 1984c:I-4).

Other leading Socialist party members besides Sr. Gonzalez, also supported continued Spanish membership in NATO. Defense Minister Narcis Serra was one who loudly proclaimed NATO's benefits for Spain. In an interview with

a leading Spanish newspaper on 20 January 1985, he stated it would be a "historic irresponsibility" for Spain to withdraw from NATO "at the time when Spain should be incorporating itself into Europe (Shumacher, 1986a:I-1)." Sr. Narcis Serra expressed his belief that belonging to the NATO alliance was part of "the maturation process for Spanish Democracy (Shumacher, 1986a:I-1)."

The Decalogo. When Felipe Gonzalez and the Socialist party came into power in October 1982, they made a pledge to the Spanish people that they, the populace, would decide the fate of Spanish participation in NATO. When the leaders of the PSOE began to warm to NATO membership, a course was required to sway the opinion of the basic PSOE member. The PSOE had promised a referendum and party leaders had to devise a way for the referendum to work in their favor.

A national defense position was established for the PSOE based upon the ten point security policy paper, the 'decalogo' produced by Prime Minister Gonzalez in October 1984. This defense policy was built to find a satisfactory ground to accommodate the feelings of Spaniards on both sides of the NATO question. The 'decalogo' allowed Spain to remain in NATO; however, many concessions were created to accommodate the anti-NATO supporters (Smith, 1989:213, Sanchez Gijon, 1986:80).

The 'decalogo's' three major points were summarized as follows: Spain would remain outside NATO's integrated

military command structure; the United States' military forces in Spain would be reduced; and, Spain would remain nuclear-free, support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the disarmament negotiations. These were the three primary components of the policy and each was integrated into the referendum (See Appendix 1). Other portions of the 'decalogo' called for Spain to seek membership in the Western European Union, to develop better defense cooperation with the other western European nations, and to work towards the integration of Gibraltar into Spain once again. The 'decalogo' also required consensus support of the Spanish people for Spanish security policies. The package made an effort to please everybody involved, and was supported by the PSOE Congress in December 1984 (Smith, 1989:213-4).

The Referendum. With regards to the referendum on NATO membership, the prime minister initially claimed his Socialist government would maintain a neutral stance on the issue. However, in May of 1984, Gonzalez reversed his posture, indicating the government would take a stand on the referendum and even suggested his Socialist government would tie its future to the outcome (Darnton, 1984:I-14).

The responsibility of convincing the Spanish population that NATO membership benefited Spain posed an extremely difficult task for the Socialists. According to a 1983 poll conducted by a popular Spanish newspaper, El País, the population of Spain was more pacifist, less anti-Soviet, and

more anti-American than any other European nation. Fifty-five percent favored the unilateral nuclear disarmament of Western Europe, higher than any other western European country. Only eighteen percent of the Spaniards polled considered the Soviets to be behind the international East versus West tensions, compared to forty-three percent in Great Britain, fifty-five percent in West Germany, and thirty-nine percent in France. Spaniards also believed with a two-to-one ratio that the United States was more likely to start a nuclear war than the Soviet Union (Prevost, 1985/86:354). The anti-NATO campaign of the Socialist party almost worked too well for the PSOE and extensive efforts were exerted in order to undo the perception, which they (the PSOE) had been instrumental in creating, that belonging to NATO was not in Spain's best interests.

A high level of concern was expressed by NATO officials about Spain's referendum. No other NATO member had ever held a referendum on alliance membership, and the fear existed that Spain would set a precedence to be followed by other nations such as Greece where the anti-NATO sentiment was especially high. The concern also persisted that the Spanish government would not carry the majority vote, thereby causing a politically delicate situation within Spain (Chipman, 1988:169). A final fear expressed was that Spain would become the first alliance member to actually quit NATO. The withdrawal of Spain from NATO would weaken the alliance's southern flank and providing a staggering

psychological blow to the West in a time when solidarity was specifically needed because of the arms control talks with the Soviet Union (Shumacher, 1986b:I-5).

The Socialist government strongly believed the referendum had to be held. Three reasons were furnished by the PSOE for continuing with the referendum:

1. Failure to hold the referendum would damage the PSOE's prestige and, consequently, that of any party aspiring to hold office because non-adherence to a solemn commitment might considerably harm the credibility of the incipient democratic political class.
2. Any damage done to the PSOE's prestige would be detrimental to the nation given the PSOE's pledge to undertake a thorough modernization of Spain.
3. If the Spanish people, under the proper guidance of the government, were to support the government in the referendum, this would make it possible to develop security policy in the future on a much firmer basis. It would also help to get rid of the NATO issue, thus ending all the strife that it had caused. (Chipman, 1988:168-9)

Another reason for holding the referendum, referred to by Javier Perez Royo, was that the outcome of the referendum vote would obligate the Socialist government to take certain measures already chosen by the government. Sr. Perez Royo indicates that a loss of "freedom to maneuver" became a positive aspect for the Spanish government in its negotiations with NATO and the United States because the Spaniards could always point to the issues "decided upon by the Spanish people." The firm, unwavering stance by the Spanish delegates in the negotiations over the reduction of

American troops was much more forceful because of the referendum results (Perez Royo, 1988:22-23).

The PSOE campaigned heavily in favor of a 'Yes' vote to NATO membership in the March 1986 referendum. The party called upon the Spanish people to "support NATO entry in the interest of Spain." The media was utilized extensively to press home the Socialist's view. Factors offered to the populace were dispersed in advertisements which warned that breaking with the Atlantic alliance would severely hamper the Spanish economy by obstructing exports, hampering the nation's "industrial and technology development," and "diminish capital investments," which were needed in the creation of new industries in Spain (Socialist Review, 1988:54).

The argument suggesting future economic hardship for Spain if the nation withdrew from the alliance was founded upon the fact that by the Spring of 1986 Spain was directly involved in "eight joint weapon ventures" with other alliance members. Gonzalez demonstrated that losing Spain's share of NATO's "industrial pie" would badly damage Spain's struggling economy. Gonzalez also able pointed to possible economic retaliation from the United States and other western European nations if Spain withdrew from NATO. Spain received some indication of possible actions in 1984, when, in a totally unexpected decision reversal, the U.S. Department of Defense decided to purchase a brand new, untested British transport plane over the time-proven

Spanish built Avicor. This decision occurred at a time when Spain was still unsure of her future in NATO and shortly after Fidel Castro's state visit to Spain during which he was warmly embraced by Prime Minister Gonzalez and his government. Interestingly enough, shortly after the referendum, the Department of Defense informed the Spanish government that the Avicor would again be purchased by the United States military (Bleifuss, 1987:165). Although the Avicor's purchase was later cancelled due to U.S. budgetary reductions, the point was well made with the Spanish government.

The Spanish people were also told by the Socialist government that breaking with the alliance would take the nation backwards into their past where the country would still operate under "the exclusive bilateral relationship with the USA." The Socialists repeatedly pointed to the fact that the nation's withdrawal from NATO would only create problems for Spain without generating any advantages in return (Socialist Review, 1988:54).

In the final tally, after a heated campaign on the referendum issue, the Spanish Socialist government survived the NATO referendum by receiving 53 percent of the votes in favor of remaining in NATO to 40 percent against, with the rest of the ballots either being blank or invalid (Shumacher, 1986a:I-1).

V. U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreements

The 1953 Pact of Madrid

The 1953 Pact of Madrid was composed of three separate but interdependent agreements. The three agreements were a Defense Agreement, a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and an Economic Aid Agreement. The most important part of the Pact, for the purposes of this paper, was the Defense Agreement, which authorized the United States to develop, maintain, and utilize, jointly with the Spanish government, military bases in Spain (Whitaker, 1961:44-45).

The wording of the 1953 Defense Agreement was very vague and did not constitute a "full-fledged" military alliance between the two countries since the "mutual obligations of the two governments in case of war" were not specified. Never-the-less, a quasi-alliance was formed, if for no other reason than the United States established military facilities in Spain. The creation of the U.S. bases brought Spain under the international umbrella of the United States and, as Article I of the 1953 Agreement states, associates the two governments in the "policy of strengthening the defenses of the West (Whitaker, 1961:45)."

The bilateral agreement of 1953 between the United States and Spain effectively brought "Spain directly into the American-led system of European defense," and yet the accord between the two nations "did not integrate Spain into

the multilateral command structure of NATO (Rodriguez, 1988:59)."

The Bases. The three principal United States' air bases in Spain were constructed in the mid-1950s to provide the United States with facilities to accommodate the B-47 bomber, a medium-range bomber which at the time was the backbone of America's strategic nuclear force. The naval base at Rota was initially designed to support the U.S. naval operations from the carrier groups operating in the western Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic. In the early 1960s, as part of the 1963 renewal agreement, Rota became one of the homes for a squadron of the United State's long-range Polaris nuclear submarines (Chavkin, 1976:15-16; Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:83).

Of all the military installations in Spain, the naval facility at Rota, near the port city of Cadiz on the southern tip of Spain, continues to be the most critical base for the United States because of the support the installation provides for the U. S. Navy's 6th Fleet. This base "represents the key to the Strait of Gibraltar and the two adjacent Atlantic and Mediterranean zones (Luria, 1986:16)." One of the primary missions carried out from Rota Naval Air Station is the detection and tracking of Soviet ships and submarines. In recent years the military facility at Rota has taken on a new significance for the Spaniards by becoming an important installation for Spain's naval forces, the majority of which are currently being

stationed there (Luria, 1986:16). The United States would be hard pressed to find another location more advantageous to base her naval forces in the western Mediterranean area.

Zaragoza Air Base, near the city of Zaragoza in the northeastern portion of Spain, would also be extremely difficult to replace, primarily because of the weapon's range at Las Bardenas Reales, which is utilized by aircraft from all over Europe to practice bombing missions. The Bardenas Reales range is highly touted by Spain's NATO allies because it offers consistent year round usage due to a yearly average of 300 days of sunshine (Luria, 1986:16).

Torrejon Air Base was the other major air base constructed by the United States in Spain. The base was located on the outskirts of Madrid as a reminder to Spaniards of the agreement between Franco and the U.S. and for the convenience the base facilities would offer Spain once the Americans finally left Spain (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:34-35). The Air base maintains the longest military runway in Europe and is the current home to the headquarters of the United States 16th Air Force as well as the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, the largest fighter wing in USAFE (United States Air Forces in Europe). Losing the base at Torrejon would remove the only U.S. Air Force aircraft from the southern region of the NATO alliance (Mecham, 1988:22).

Agreement Renewals

The 1963 Renewal. The original 1953 Pact between Spain and the United States was to last for a period of ten years and was to be automatically extended for two successive five year periods unless otherwise terminated by one of the two parties (Whitaker 1961:45). The negotiations between the two nations over the initial renewal of the Agreement were tense since the Franco government informed the U.S. they desired to re-negotiate the terms of the 1953 agreement and not automatically extend them (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:79).

Both parties wanted the bases to remain in Spain, and yet both parties found it difficult to arrive at a consensus. The Franco government, understanding the importance placed on the military bases by the Americans, established a higher "premium" on the utilization of Spanish soil (Brandt, 1989:188). Consequently, Spain requested increased financial aid for a continued U.S. military presence in Spain. The United States left no doubt as to its desire to renew the agreement; however, the U.S. Congress made it clear Spain could no longer expect to receive an "amount of financial assistance for Spain that reflected the Spanish view." In fact, on 20 March 1963, the House Foreign Affairs committee issued the Clay Report on Foreign Aid, which claimed the U.S. aid to Spain was "excessive." Because of the House report, Spain only received a grant of \$100 million in military aid, of which

\$50 million was identified for the purchase of American equipment (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:80).

The 1963 Defense Agreement was finally signed and put into effect for the next five years. The United States linked the agreement to the American commitment to European defense by stating that the "defense agreements of Spain and the United States form a part of the security arrangements for the Atlantic and the Mediterranean areas." The two nations also announced, in a joint declaration, that a "threat to either country would be a matter of common concern to both countries (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:82-83)."

The 1963 Defense Agreement worked well for both nations; however, "warning signals" were sent by both sides indicating future negotiations would be difficult. Spain placed an ever increasing value on the importance of the continued operation of the bases, and the U.S. demonstrated that the American Congress would pay closer scrutiny to future requests of assistance for Spain.

The 1968 Renewal. In early 1968, the Spanish government informed the United States that an automatic five-year extension was not desired and that the Defense Agreement would once again need to be re-negotiated. Spain initially requested one billion dollars in military aid while the United States offered \$140 million in military grant aid. Spain lowered their request to \$700 million and still the U.S. would not increase their offer to more than

\$175 million. In September 1968, Spain formally invoked the termination clause of the agreements, which provided the two parties six months in which to come to an arrangement or the American forces would be required to leave Spain (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:87-88).

Palomares Incident. The 1968 negotiations marked the first time the Spanish government needed to justify the presence of American armed forces to the Spanish people. The Spaniards acquired a first hand look at the possibilities of a nuclear weapon's accident from the Palomares accident on January 17, 1966. On this date, a midair collision between a B-52 bomber and a KC-135 tanker resulted in the inadvertent release of four unarmed nuclear bombs, which fell near the Spanish costal fishing village of Palomares. The military recovered three of these weapons within hours of the accident; however, the fourth bomb was not found until 80 days after the accident (Rubottom and Murphy, 1984:85). The incident resulted in the Spanish government's demand that no U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear bombs be allowed to overfly Spain. The Palomares accident also awakened a fear in Spain of the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons.

The Nixon Administration came into office in the United States in January 1969 and expressed a strong desire to come to an accord with Spain. The two governments reached an interim agreement in 1969, which put an end to the termination clause until the two nations worked out a final

agreement. The new Defense Agreement was signed on 6 August 1970 at a cost of \$300 million to the U. S., the majority of which was in the form of bank credits to utilize purchasing American military equipment (Cortada, 1978:240-241).

The 1976 Treaty. The negotiations for the renewal of the Defense Agreement began late in 1974 and were concluded on 4 October 1975 when the announcement was made of "a new framework agreement governing cooperative relationships between the United States and Spain." On 23 October, two days after Spain announced Franco had suffered a severe heart attack, the U.S. State Department, anticipating Franco's demise, announced the new agreement with Spain would be submitted for Congressional approval, thus elevating the "Agreement" to Treaty status. This move was made by the U.S. to help solidify relationships between the two nations as Spain moved into a new era of leadership without Franco. The death of Franco on 20 November 1975 gave Spain the leverage required in the United States' Congress as the new Spanish government, under King Juan Carlos, invited the United States to show real support "to the new monarchy." The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on 24 January 1976 and marked a new era of relations between Spain and the United States (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:113-115).

One of the problems encountered in the 1976 negotiations concerned the operation of the air bases to resupply Israel during a war in the Middle East. Spain did

not recognize Israel as a nation and assured some of the Arab states that the United States would not be permitted to utilize Spanish soil to help Israel. Spain was embarrassed during the 1973 Yom Kippur war because the U.S. Air Force "allegedly used aerial tankers from the Spanish bases to refuel transports in flight to Israel," even though this action had been prohibited by the Spanish government (Brandt, 1989:189-190)."

The 1976 treaty significantly reduced the amount of military grant money from the 1970 agreement. The treaty only authorized \$75 million in military grants; however, \$120 million a year in credits was set aside for each of the treaty's five years (Brandt 1989:190). The treaty also called for the removal of the United States' nuclear submarines from Rota by 1 July 1979, as well as requiring the United States to agree that no nuclear weapons "or their components" would be stored in Spain (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:117).

The 1982 Agreement. The renewal of the Defense Agreement on 2 July 1982 was unique since the treaty arrangement disappeared in favor of the former executive agreement. The renewal occurred during the same time frame of Spain's admittance into NATO and was designed to compliment the alliance's treaty. According to Brandt, under the 1982 agreement the United States was to make the effort to help modernize the Spanish armed forces by committing "to use its best efforts to provide defense

support for the Government of Spain on the best terms possible (Brandt, 1989:191)."

One of the difficulties encountered in the negotiations was over the possible use of the air bases by the United States' Rapid Deployment Force in the case of a "flare-up" in the Middle East. The Spanish government was adamant about maintaining the ability to decide, on a case by case basis, about the utilization of the bases (Appel, 1982:I-3). When the Socialist party came into power, the 1982 Defense Agreement had already been signed by the two governments. However, the new ruling party made the point clear that "there are no U.S. bases in Spain," explaining that instead "there are Spanish bases which are loaned to the United States under certain conditions for certain uses, and in return for certain benefits (Rumbottom and Murphy, 1984:144)."

The 1988 Base Negotiations & Force Reductions

The 1988 Renewal. When the Defense Agreement renegotiation talks began in July 1986, the initial thrust from the Spaniards dealt with the reduction of the tanker operations at Zaragoza AB. The reasoning of the Spanish delegation was colored by the recent U.S. bombing raid on Libya and because the KC-135 tanker aircraft that refueled the F-111s performing the bombing mission, deployed to Great Britain from Zaragoza a few days prior to the raid. The Spanish government's disapproval of the Libyan raid was

clearly reflected early in the negotiations (Smith, 1989:218).

The focus of the negotiations quickly shifted to the removal of the American fighter aircraft from Torrejon AB. A major reason behind choosing Torrejon AB stemmed from the 72 U.S. F-16 fighters stationed a scant twelve miles from Madrid. Spaniards expressed the fear of their capital city becoming a prime target for nuclear weapons because of the U.S. warplanes. Even though no nuclear weapons were stored in Spain, Spaniards elicited a strong political reaction against maintaining a nuclear capable weapon systems so close to the nation's capital (Smith, 1989:218).

Spaniards have come to view the American F-16s stationed at Torrejon Air Base as part of the "Middle East and Mediterranean interests of the United States;" whereas, the U.S. considers these aircraft to be the mainstay of NATO's southern flank. The continued presence of these aircraft in Europe's southern region becomes even more important considering the INF treaty reached between the Soviets and the Americans in 1987, concerning the reduction of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. With the eventual drawdown of the European theater's nuclear missiles, an increased emphasis will be placed on conventional forces. The 401st TFW's presence in the Mediterranean is considered to be important in maintaining the balance of power between the two military blocs (Delaney, 1987:I-12).

Spanish reaction was initially quite harsh to the United State's claim that removal of the F-16s, which comprise the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, stationed at Torrejon Air Base would severely weaken NATO's southern flank. When Caspar Weinberger, the United State's former Secretary of Defense, stated the F-16s stationed in Spain belonged to NATO, the Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, was appalled Mr. Weinberger would make such a claim since the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Spain never mentioned NATO's security (Smith, 1989:219). Sr. Gonzalez's protests were largely unfounded since, as this research has already indicated, the wording of the initial Defense Agreement left little doubt that the bases were to be used to maintain the security of the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions, both of which fall under NATO's area of responsibility.

Even though U.S. forces in Spain have never been officially described as belonging to NATO, the purpose of the aircraft stationed at Torrejon AB is to deploy to Aviano Air Base, Italy and Incirlik Air Base, Turkey in support of the southern flank of the NATO alliance. According to Dan Smith, the fact that these forces were not officially assigned to NATO was just "polite fiction." He states that "initially the desire had been to avoid Western European ire at Franco's dictatorship effectively being a NATO ally." He continues by claiming "Later it was to avoid suspicions in newly democratic Spain that it was effectively in the

western alliance whether it decided to be or not (Smith, 1989:219)."

Spanish officials finally acknowledged the U.S. fighters indeed existed to support NATO. In September 1987, Narcis Serra, Spain's Defense Minister, was quoted as saying "the F-16s had come to Spain as an instrument of the SACEUR's (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) Flexible Response strategy (Smith, 1989:219)." The Flexible Response idea is based on the concept that NATO should be able to deter and counter varying levels of military aggression in any and every area encompassed by the alliance. This strategy, according to the doctrine, can only be secured by a wide variety of forces "equipped with a well-balanced mixture of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear weapons (Sloan, 1985:140)." The Torrejon F-16s are capable of countering military aggression throughout the southern reaches of NATO.

Usefulness of the Bases. The fact should be noted that the U.S. military facilities in Spain are not as useful as they could be due to strong constraints placed upon their operation by the Spanish government. One such example of these constraints placed upon the Americans occurred in 1973 when arms and other goods, bound for Israel, were not allowed to pass through Spain. Another case was the denial given to the U.S. to refuel American F-15 aircraft on their way to Saudi Arabia during the 1979 crisis in Iran when the Shah's government was overthrown and the American hostages

were taken by the Iranians storming the U.S. embassy (Treverton, 1988:128). From the inception of the defense relationship with the United States, Spain emphasized that her territories and facilities would not be utilized by the Americans in a "bilateral dispute with another country." In 1986, Spain once again demonstrated its resolve by denying Spanish airspace to the U.S. bombers participating in the raid on Libya (Delaney, 1988:I-3). Gregory Treverton does not see the situation changing in the future. He points out that "the United States will be unable to count on the bases for purposes outside NATO, especially for sensitive operations in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf (Treverton, 1988:128)."

Force Reduction. The decision by the Spanish government to insist upon the withdrawal of the 401st TFW from Torrejon Air Base, was a significant shift in bilateral relations between Spain and the United States. The Socialist government under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez has diligently attempted to "shift its focus of defense cooperation from the United States to Western Europe." The United State's military presence in Spain received ever increasing opposition from the Spanish populace since the establishment of a democratic government in the country. From the Spanish government's viewpoint, the reduction of U.S. forces in Spain was necessary in order to fulfill the promises made by the Socialist party in the campaign for the 1986 NATO referendum (Guangsheng, 1987:16). The pledge to

reduce the number of American servicemen in Spain was, according to Spanish government officials, "part of a strategy to win public support from keeping this country within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The Spanish Prime Minister resorted to this strategy to try and persuade his countrymen to stay in the alliance. U.S. troop reduction was the bait Sr. Gonzalez used to hook his fellow countrymen on NATO (Shumacher, 1984b:I-12). The forceful stance on the part of the Socialist government also demonstrated to the Spanish nation that Spain was not just a puppet of the United States, but an independent nation willing to stand up for its peoples' desires.

The United States government was not blind to the political pressures mounting in Spain with regards to a U.S. troop reduction. Early in 1986, a compromise was proposed which would not hurt U.S. requirements and would allow Prime Minister Gonzalez to keep his referendum promise. In 1982, the base agreement set an upper level of 12,500 American servicemen to be stationed in Spain. At the time of the referendum, in March 1986, the actual number of troops in Spain was only 9,500. The thought offered by the U.S. entailed a new agreement setting the upper limit of forces at 9,500 instead of 12,500, a level approximately 25 percent lower than the current number. This arrangement would permit Sr. Gonzalez to show the Spanish people a reduction of the American presence by 25 percent when in reality no reduction would have been made. This idea was shot down by

the Spanish because Gonzalez felt obligated to show an actual withdrawal of American military troops in order to bolster his political standings (Smith, 1989:218).

Economic Impact. In Spain's effort to reduce the presence of U.S. military forces from Torrejon Air Base, the costs of maintaining the operational status of the base for the purposes of the Spanish air force was originally overlooked. The Spaniards did not count on the entire U.S. military population departing from Torrejon since the 401st TFW was not the only organization to occupy the installation. The Spanish government now estimates the cost for maintaining the operational status of the base to accommodate Spanish forces at approximately \$43.5 million for the first year, with subsequent years costing half that amount. These figures do not take into account the financial losses to be experienced by the local population because of the drawdown of the base (Spain Counts Cost, 1988:1313).

Negotiation Problems. The recent negotiations between Spain and the United States were difficult for both countries. The members of the United State's delegation had difficulty accepting the hard-line position maintained by the Spanish delegation. Throughout the entire negotiation sessions, the Spanish never wavered with their insistence that the U.S. fighter aircraft be removed from Torrejon Air Base. American officials constantly expressed their firm belief that the withdrawal of the aircraft would severely

weaken the southern flank of NATO; however, these cries consistently fell upon deaf ears (Delaney, 1988:I-3).

In 1985 and 1986 as part of the referendum campaign, the Prime Minister had promised the Spanish people the F-16s would leave the Madrid area and the U.S. military presence would be significantly reduced if the voters would elect to stay in the NATO alliance. For Gonzalez to retract his party's pledge would have been political suicide, especially since the referendum only carried a "yes" vote of 52 percent, even after the massive pro-NATO media blitz campaign by the Gonzalez government (Delaney, 1988:I-3).

Communication Problems. One of the major problems plaguing the base talks was a lack of good communication between the two delegations. According to Tulchin, private interviews with the Spanish negotiators indicated Spain would agree to the removal of the 401st TFW from Torrejon Air Base and not drastically touch the other U.S. operations in Spain. At the same time, interviews with the U.S. delegation found the United States would begrudgingly accept the relocation of its F-16s from Madrid. Spain also informally proposed the aircraft be moved to another Spanish base, away from the nation's capital. This suggestion was rejected by then Secretary of Defense Weinberger, who "claimed that the move would be too costly and that he would not sanction such an expense while the administration was under pressure to cut the defense budget (Tulchin, 1988:169)." Later on in the negotiations, the United States

proposed the same scenario to the Spanish delegation only to have the idea rejected by the Spaniards.

Throughout the negotiations, the U.S. maintained if no agreement could be reached between the two countries the United States was prepared to withdraw its troops from Spain, an event not even requested by the Spanish government. A U.S. State Department spokesman, Charles E. Redman, stated "If we cannot find a way to bridge our differences on this issue and the current agreement runs out, then, of course, we will leave (Shumacher, 1987:I-6)."

Part of the obstacle to be overcome in the negotiations concerned the United States desire for Spain to take over the military commitment to NATO currently maintained by the F-16s stationed at Torrejon. This plan would send Spanish aircraft and personnel to Italy and Turkey to strengthen up the NATO's southern front. The American proposal was consistently put down by the Spanish delegates because the Spanish government staunchly refused to "take on NATO roles outside immediate Spanish Defense needs (Shumacher, 1987:I-6)." Considering the non-nuclear position of the Spanish government and the fact that the United States' nuclear capable F-16 aircraft deploy from Torrejon AB to their forward operating locations where their nuclear weapons are stored, the proposal for Spain to pick up the NATO commitment of the Torrejon aircraft was doomed to failure from the start.

Tense Relations. Tense relations existed between Spain and the United States throughout the negotiation periods. Vernon Walter, the chief U.S. delegate to the United Nations, made the statement that the United States would not soon forget such "an unfriendly gesture" (the withdrawal of the 401st TFW) by the Spanish nation. What Mr. Walter overlooked, was the manner in which Franco had "flaunted" the Defense Agreement as evidence to the world, and especially to the Spanish population, that the United States supported and backed his dictatorship. A point that should also be remembered is that when the initial agreement was struck in 1953, one of the most influential scholars and diplomats of the exiled democrats, Salvador de Madariaga, spoke for his fellow compatriots in a letter to the New York Times, claiming "Spain, when free, may repudiate agreements signed when she was gagged (The Planes in Spain, 1988:I-18)." The Spanish people have a much different perspective on American forces than does the majority of Western Europe. Throughout Europe, U.S. military bases have been identified as defenses for freedom and democracy; however, in Spain, the bases have been considered as a "prop of tyranny (The Planes in Spain, 1988:I-18)."

On November 10, 1987, the Spanish government officially notified the United States the friendship, defense and cooperation agreement, due to terminate on May 14, 1988, would not be renewed. The significance of this action was such that if a new agreement could not be reached before the

termination date, the United States would be forced to withdraw its armed forces from the four military bases, seven communications sites, two observation posts, and one ammunition depot within one year from the expiration of the agreement (Guangsheng, 1987:16).

In December of 1987, one month after the official notification that the old agreement would not be renewed, Felipe Gonzalez broke off negotiations concerning Torrejon AB, informing the United States the F-16 fighters stationed there would need to be removed from Spain within three and a half years. After a year and a half attempting to formulate a new Defense Agreement permitting the continued utilization of Torrejon AB by the 401st TFW, Gonzalez made the issue crystal clear that the F-16s were to leave Spanish soil. This rejection of the F-16s was the first unilateral reduction of U.S. forces by a European NATO ally "since France closed American installations in 1966 and withdrew from NATO's unified military command (Sciolino, 1988:I-6)."

The United States government informed the Spanish Foreign Ministry on 4 January 1988 that the U.S. would not fight the removal of the three squadrons of F-16s from Torrejon Air Base. The U.S. did emphasize the "importance of a new accord on other areas of military cooperation." The issue of the Defense Agreement needed to be quickly resolved in order to affirm "the strength of the Spanish-American bilateral relationship (Sciolino, 1988:I-6)."

With the bounds of a new agreement now established, the two negotiation teams, led by Spain's Foreign Minister, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, and America's Ambassador to Spain, Reginald Bartholomew, were quickly able to come to terms on the basic features of the new friendship, defense and cooperation agreement in talks occurring during the first two weeks of January 1988 (Delaney, 1988:I-3). On 15 January 1988, Spain and the United States issued a joint statement outlining the proposed base agreement:

The governments of the United States and Spain have reached agreement principle on a new framework to replace the 1982 agreement on friendship, defense, and cooperation.

1. Under the terms of the new defense agreement, the use by the United States of operational and support installations in Spain and the authorizations for use of Spanish territory, territorial sea, and air space will be continued. Agreements shall also be concluded for crisis and wartime use of Spanish installations and land, sea, and air space by the United States in support of NATO reinforcement plans.
2. The initial term of the new agreement will be 8 years with provision for extension for successive 1-year periods.
3. In compliance with the sovereign decision of the Government of Spain, the United States will withdraw from Spain the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing within 3 years of the effective date of the new agreement.
4. There will not be in the agreement nor related to it any commitment by the parties concerning military or economic assistance in the form of grants or credits.
5. Future educational, cultural, scientific, and technological cooperation will be based on new and equitable formulas and will be separate from the new defense agreement. (U.S., Spain Announce, 1988:69)

An official spokesman for the U.S. State Department issued a short statement critical of the unwillingness of

the Spaniards to allow the 401st TFW to remain in Spain, but pointed to the new "Agreement in principle" as a confirmation of the solidity of the U.S.-Spanish defense relationship. The spokesman continued by saying "We still have a lot of work to do to fill in the details of the new agreement, but with the framework reflected in the joint statement, we will be able to move ahead expeditiously (Delaney, 1988:I-3)."

The final agreement was eventually reached on 28 September 1988 after many months of frustrating negotiations between the two nations. The issue of the U.S. bases and armed forces in Spain has been a major irritant in the relationship between the two nations for a number of years (Sciolino, 1988:I-6). The withdrawal of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing and the other tenant units from Torrejon Air Base by 1991 and an eight year period until the next renewal of the Defense Agreement should foster more stable relations between Spain and the United States.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

This chapter summarizes the major findings of the research effort and answers the investigative questions from the first chapter. This final chapter also contains conclusions drawn from the research and recommendations for possible studies to supplement this thesis.

Research Questions

Question 1. What has been the historical position of Spain with regard to the United States, to other European countries, and to the Soviet Union?

The historical perspective of relations between Spain and the United States has generally been antagonistic in nature. Although the two nations have rarely been at arms with each other, the Spanish-American War being the only exception during the past century, the perception of the United States held by most Spaniards is not a friendly one. The memory of the tight hold Francisco Franco held over Spain is still fresh in the minds of Spaniards and the U.S. is pictured as the nation that helped salvage Franco's government at a time when the regime was in severe trouble. The bilateral Defense Agreements provided Franco with the required economic resources and international recognition necessary to bolster his government. The Spanish Left

refuses to forgive the United States although the current Socialist government has expressed the desire to be accepted into the family of the western world, in which the United States maintains a prominent position.

Spain's historical relationship with the Soviet Union is unique when compared with the other western nations and their dealings with the Soviets. Spain has not lived with the Russian threat as have the Germans and the other northern European countries. Spain and Russia have not experienced many dealings over the past two hundred years, and the major interaction the two nations did experience was when the Soviets came to the aid of the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War, thus endearing themselves to many Spaniards. For the entire period of Franco's reign, the Spanish population was fed a constant diet of anti-communist rhetoric focused against the Soviet Union. The Spanish people have indicated some skepticism towards this view, and a democratic Spain has established a fairly good relationship with the U.S.S.R..

Spain's history of isolationism from world affairs over the past century impeded the nation's quest to emerge from its shell of neutrality. Throughout the Franco years, Spain was shunned by the rest of Europe. Western European nations fought long and hard to rid the world of the Axis Powers, and Franco's Fascist government was a powerful reminder of what they had struggled to abolish. Spain's relationship with other western European states improved dramatically

since the institution of a democratic government; however, Spain's endeavor to become a member of both NATO and the EEC was an extremely slow process. The history of Spain in the twentieth century differs greatly from the rest of Western Europe, bringing forth contrasting perspectives and perceptions on many important issues.

Spain has begun to break out of her long period of isolationism and has cast her lot with the western bloc nations. Narcis Serra, Spain's current Defense Minister, states that even though "Spain is not involved in the background causes of the superpower confrontation" she is "not immune to the consequences of this struggle for hegemony (Serra, 1985:63)." Because of Spain's increased political and economical involvement with Western Europe, Serra believes "if Western Europe were ever to suffer a military defeat or were simply insufficiently prepared to defend itself and thus rendered vulnerable to a political or military threat, Spain's democracy would suffer serious consequences." He concludes by saying "Spain is so committed to the Western world, that one cannot see how Spain could avoid being dragged into an East-West conflict that might arise (Serra, 1985:63)." One of the only major obstacles in Spain's future will be overcoming the perception that the United States is one of the nations wearing the black hat.

Question 2. What is the strategic importance of Spain to NATO?

The entrance of Spain into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1982 would not have significantly improved the military might of the alliance even if Spain's newly elected Socialist government had not halted its nation's military integration into the alliance. However, in the few years since becoming an alliance member, Spain made significant strides towards improving her nation's defense forces.

The Socialist government recognized the necessity to improve the Spanish armed services and embarked upon an intensive program to improve Spain's military capabilities. The procurement of modern weapon systems and the streamlining of the army promise to increase Spain's potential military contribution in the event of a European confrontation.

Even though the Spanish government still refuses to fall under the NATO unified command structure, the Iberian nation has developed a Plan Estrategico Conjunto (PEC, or joint strategic plan) outlining the Spanish defense policy and how Spain would cooperate with NATO forces in times of armed conflict (Gallego Serra, 1989:329).

One example of Spain's new defense policy deals with the Spanish navy's new Battle Group Alpha formed around the new aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias. The stated

mission of this battle group in the scenario of an invasion of Western Europe by Warsaw Pact forces would be to protect Spain's "maritime traffic and that of its NATO allies in the Atlantic and in the vicinity of Gibraltar and the Canaries (Gallego Serra, 1989:329)."

Spain also decided to form a Fuerza de Intervencion Rapida (Rapid Deployment Force) from existing units in the armed forces. One of the primary missions of this force will be to fulfill Spain's NATO obligations of military contribution, again, outside of NATO's integrated military structure (Scaramanga, 1989:435). The continuing enhancement of the Spanish armed forces and the development of Spain's joint strategic plan have improved the potential of Spanish military contributions to the NATO alliance.

Many geographical benefits were accorded to NATO from the inclusion of Spain in the alliance. At the time of Spain's addition to NATO, these geographical features were the primary strategic advantage of permitting Spain to join the alliance. Europe's primary sea lanes pass through Spanish waters and the protection of NATO's strategic sea lines of communication greatly improved because of the Spanish addition to NATO.

NATO received 'geographical depth' due to the ability to relieve some of the congestion of NATO's primary reinforcement ports and airfields in the central region by utilizing Spanish ports and airfields as prime reinforcement staging areas. The other benefits NATO would obtain from

operating Spain as a staging area for reinforcements come from the fact that Spain's topography facilitates defending the country from invading troops, and the extended distance of the Iberian peninsula from Eastern bloc countries complicates the plans for an attacking air force because of the anti-aircraft defenses of Spain and her other NATO allies.

The final major benefit the NATO alliance received when Spain joined was the demonstration to the Warsaw Pact nations that NATO was a viable military organization with growth potential. Western Europe has indicated, through NATO, a strong resolve to uphold the principles of democracy and freedom. Spanish involvement in the alliance strengthened the western European community voice of freedom to the world.

Question 3. What is the strategic importance of NATO to Spain?

Spain entered the NATO alliance under the guidance of a right-wing political party, and maintained membership in the organization while being ruled by a left-wing party. The Spanish nation sought reentrance into the mainstream of European and World politics and NATO membership facilitated this aspiration.

The democratic government in Spain realized the importance of bringing its nation into the European Economic

Community. Overtones from other western European leaders indicated the only way Spain would be allowed to fully participate in the Common Market would be to remain a NATO alliance member. Although other nations are not participants of both organizations, Spain remained within NATO and gained membership in the EEC.

NATO membership helped reestablish the Spanish defense industry by opening the doors to many European military programs. The Spanish government currently participates in as many programs as possible "in the hope that even those not vital to national security may assist in the technical development of Spanish industry (Spain Pushes, 1989:392)."

The Spanish armed forces are now on the road to becoming a force to be reckoned with in the western Mediterranean region. The Socialist government worked to improve the status of the armed forces by performing necessary cuts in personnel and improving the quality of the equipment being employed. These actions appear to have reduced the desire by portions of the armed forces' to overthrow the democratic government, one of Spain's objectives upon joining NATO, thereby allowing the democratic process to gain strength in Spain. It is questionable whether NATO membership solved the problems with Spain's armed forces or not because Spain has continued to remain outside the alliance's integrated military structure; however, the progress occurred while Spain was an alliance member and NATO member.

Spanish concerns over its North African possessions and the Canary Islands still exist since these Spanish territories fall outside the boundaries of the NATO organization. A possible NATO benefit that might extend to Spain is that possible aggressor nations might think twice before coming to blows with a member of the NATO alliance.

Both Spain and NATO have benefited from the addition of Spain to the alliance. NATO is definitely better off now than it would have been without Spain and Spain has also taken advantage of being a NATO member. However, it is harder to quantify how much better off Spain has actually become due to NATO membership than if the nation had remained outside of the alliance.

Question 4. What was the political climate in Spain at the time of the nation's entrance into the NATO alliance and how has the climate changed since then?

Spain entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1982 under the direction of a Centrist government. The UCD government's aim was to continue Spain's return from a dictatorial to a democratic rule. NATO membership was viewed as an essential part of being accepted back into the western European community.

The political debate between the two primary political parties over participation in NATO was extremely heated. The PSOE was able to rally the Spanish population around an

anti-American/NATO cry and win the 1982 general elections in Spain just a few short months after the nation became an official member of the alliance. The UCD government had been in control of Spain's leadership for a very short time under Calvo Sotelo's guidance and realized the Socialists would, in all probability, win the 1982 elections. Javier Tusell writes that the leadership of the UCD party hoped to establish a "situation whereby the PSOE would come to its own realization, once in control of the government, that participation in NATO was in the national interest (Tusell, 1988:14)."

The Socialist party did change their position with regards to NATO membership shortly after coming to power. Felipe Gonzalez's government realized Spain would benefit more by remaining within the alliance instead of withdrawing from the organization. The PSOE was then required to labor diligently in order to transform an anti-NATO sentiment into a pro-NATO vote on the referendum. Prime minister Felipe Gonzalez told the people Spain's NATO membership was closely tied to the nation's entrance into the European Economic Community. The Socialist leaders also made many concessions in order to sway popular opinion. The actual referendum was worded in such a way that by voting against NATO membership, the bilateral agreement with the United States would not be modified, and a reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Spain was an occurrence all Spaniards hoped for.

Following the Socialists' referendum victory in 1986, the NATO leaders accepted a Spanish document which defined the method for Spanish integration into the alliance. Spain agreed to contribute to the collective defense of the alliance while remaining outside of the military structure. Spanish participation in the Atlantic alliance under the PSOE government is not the fully integrated model envisioned by the UCD government in 1982; however, Spain has remained a part of the organization and has continued to define its role as an alliance member.

Question 5. What is the Spanish government's perception of their nation's commitment to the rest of Europe and to the NATO countries in particular?

Spain's democratic government opted to take their nation from a position of neutrality into the mainstream of European affairs by joining the NATO alliance and the Common Market. By becoming more involved in the political and economical activities of Europe, Spain feels obligated to support her NATO allies. The joint strategic plan formulated by the Socialist administration, outlining Spain's wartime responsibilities to NATO, is an example of Spain's commitment to the western world's 'way of life.'

Question 6. What are the United States' and the other NATO countries' perceptions of Spain's purpose as a NATO member?

Spain's NATO allies exhibited much patience with Spain's young democratic governments over the past fourteen years. Spain has been given the necessary time to define its national and foreign policies and work toward these policies fulfillment. These same NATO allies believe Spain incurred a responsibility towards the common defense of Western Europe when she became an alliance member. The remarks by Helmut Kohl and other European leaders indicating Spain would not be as welcome in the EEC, without contributing to the defense of NATO, demonstrates quite clearly the feelings of Spain's allies about Spain's purpose as an alliance member.

Question 7. What is the significance of the large reduction of U.S. forces from Spain?

The reduction of U.S. military forces in Spain will reduce NATO's capabilities in the alliance's southern region. The F-16 aircraft from the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing are able to quickly deploy from Spain to their forward operating locations in Italy and Turkey. Although NATO initially decided to relocate the 401st TFW to Crotone, Italy, reductions in the U.S. defense budget threaten to cancel the American's contribution to the European

relocation and possibly even remove the fighter wing from active duty. The active defense forces of NATO's southern flank would surely miss Torrejon's F-16s if they were not available in a European struggle.

It must be mentioned that the risk of a confrontation between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact was much higher when Spain decided to insist upon the aircraft's withdrawal from Torrejon Air Base. The restructuring of the Eastern bloc governments in the later half of 1989 and the first part of 1990, and the warming relations between the Soviet Union and the western world have increased the response time required to deploy forces into the gap left by the 401st TFW's removal. Only the passage of time will be the true measure of the military significance of the large force reduction in U.S. forces from Spain.

The political implications behind the latest Defense Agreement renewal will have a lasting impact on relations between Spain and the United States. The U.S. military forces in Spain have been a constant reminder of the international legitimacy supplied by the Americans to Franco when his regime was unable to acquire support and aid from other nations. The decision by Spain's Socialist administration to insist upon the reduction of U.S. forces in Spain indicates to Spaniards the desire of their leaders to reduce dependency on the U.S. and to lessen the reminder of Spain's tainted history. Spanish leaders also demonstrated a resolve to stand up for their beliefs and to

stand behind promises made to the nation, each will strengthen the democratic institution in Spain.

Question 8. How will Spain's desire to fully participate in the 1992 European Economic Community affect their future participation in NATO?

Spain's future participation in NATO will not be affected by her desire to fully participate in the European Economic Community. The implied ties between the two organizations already influenced Spain's decision to remain within the NATO alliance, and was one of the reasons the Socialists campaigned so diligently in favor of a "yes" vote on the 1986 referendum. Therefore, the EEC has already made its mark with regard to Spanish participation in the Atlantic alliance. Spain was admitted to the EEC in January 1986 and will become a full fledged member in 1991 and Spain's participation in the EEC should have no bearing on her future participation in the NATO alliance.

Further Research

The shifting political structure of Eastern Europe has the potential of negating the requirement for the NATO alliance's military structure. Further research could be initiated into NATO's future as a political force instead of a military power. The increase in the economical strength of the European community with the advent of 1992 also poses some interesting questions, especially since the United

States is not a member of the EEC. How will the economical relationships with the Common Market affect the foreign policy of the United States with Europe? A final thought for other research deals with the success of the NATO alliance in maintaining peace in Western Europe. Was NATO's deterrent capability responsible for the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact governments or was it the economical might of the western world?

Appendix A: The NATO Referendum in Spain, March 12, 1986:

The Question and Conditionality Clauses

The Government considers it in the national interest that Spain remain in the Atlantic Alliance and resolves that established on the following terms:

1. The participation of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance will not include its incorporation in the integrated military structure.
2. The prohibition on the installation, storing or introducing nuclear arms on Spanish territory will be continued.
3. The progressive reduction of the military presence of the United States in Spain will be proceeded with.

Do you consider it advisable for Spain to remain in the Atlantic Alliance according to the terms set forth by the government of the nation? (Rodriguez, 1988:71)

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